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ABSTRACT
EXPERIMENTATION IN EARLY-STAGE VENTURES
Andrea Contigiani
David H. Hsu
Modern entrepreneurship places strong emphasis on experimentation. However, while the
learning benefits of this strategic approach are generally accepted, we have a limited understanding of its potential costs. Motivated by this gap, this dissertation investigates the role
of experimentation in early-stage ventures. The first study develops a conceptual framework defining the construct and explaining the factors driving its impact on performance. I
define experimentation as the disclosure of an incomplete product in order to obtain market
feedback. I argue that learning, adaptation, and appropriability are the primary channels
driving its effect. The second study builds a stylized model to illustrate the learning channel.
Combining spatial differentiation and Bayesian learning, the model formalizes the notion
that experimentation is optimal only when both market uncertainty and signal precision
are sufficiently high. The third study analyzes the adaptation channel. Building on the idea
that adaptation capability depends on organizational structure, I hypothesize that experimentation is evaluated positively only when it is combined with low formal structure. I test
this argument on a proprietary dataset of venture pitches from a university-based venture
competition. I analyze the factors driving judges’ evaluations and find a negative interaction
between experimentation and formal structure. The fourth study examines the appropriability channel. I hypothesize that, when formal intellectual property is weak, ventures face
higher imitation risks and thus engage less in experimentation. I test this argument on a
hand-collected dataset of US software ventures, exploiting the US Supreme Court decision
Alice Corp vs CLS Bank International as a negative shock to patent protection. I find that,
following the ruling, the affected ventures are less likely to experiment. This dissertation
contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship, learning, structure, and appropriability,
and offers implications for entrepreneurs, investors, and policy-makers.
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PREFACE
I started my journey at the University of Pennsylvania in Summer 2010, after completing
my Master’s at Bocconi University in Milan and my Bachelor’s at LUISS University in
Rome. I began in the Economics Department at the School of Arts and Sciences. I then
worked as research assistant at Wharton Entrepreneurship. I finally joined the PhD in the
Management Department at the Wharton School in Summer 2013.
During the years before my PhD, I had the chance to explore a variety of research directions.
Curiously, during this exploration, I got to read a paper sometimes in Spring 2012 – “Motivating Innovation” (Manso, 2011) – that fundamentally shaped my trajectory. This work
elegantly explains how to design incentives to make employees more innovative. Inspired by
this reading, I realized that I could combine my long-standing passion for innovation with
rigorous and relevant academic research, and so decided to take this route.
After my second year of PhD, in Summer 2015, I started searching for a dissertation topic
and interviewed a lot of entrepreneurs. The pattern that emerged from those interviews
was the excitement around the Lean Startup (Ries, 2011) and its focus on the practice of
“experimentation”. Two conversations – one with Ajay Agrawal later that Summer and one
with Dan Levinthal later that year – convinced me that this was a topic worth studying.
This practice changed the way people think and talk about entrepreneurship, and it was
fascinating to use academic theories and methodologies to understand it more deeply. The
first step of this effort was the paper I wrote with Dan Levinthal in Summer 2016 (Contigiani
and Levinthal, 2019). I then spent the last three years developing these ideas into what
finally became this dissertation.
Andrea Contigiani
April 22nd 2019
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
1.1. Purpose
Modern entrepreneurship emphasizes the role of experimentation. Practitioners largely
agree that running rapid and frequent experiments is critical to successfully navigating the
ambiguity of new venture creation. This perspective is promoted by a variety of practitioneroriented approaches, such as Agile Development (Highsmith and Cockburn, 2001), Customer
Discovery (Blank, 2005; Blank and Dorf, 2012; Blank, 2013), Discovery Driven Planning
(McGrath and MacMillan, 2009), and the Lean Startup (Ries, 2011, 2017).
Many thought leaders in the entrepreneurial arena embrace this view. Reid Hoffman –
an early employee of PayPal and co-founder of LinkedIn – is one of the main voices in
this camp. He synthesizes this perspective by writing, “Whatever the situation, actions,
not plans, generate lessons that help you test your hypotheses against reality” (Hoffman
and Casnocha, 2012). However, some disagree. A famous case among the “dissidents”,
Peter Thiel – a co-founder of PayPal and Palantir Technologies – argues against the value
of experimentation, suggesting that clearly understanding a business idea ex ante is more
valuable than learning about it during the process. “Darwinism may be a fine theory
in other contexts,” he writes, ”but in startups, intelligent design works best” (Thiel and
Masters, 2014).
This debate mirrors a traditional conversation in the strategic management literature.
Mintzberg talks about the “schools of thought” of deliberate strategy formation and emergent strategy formation (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Ghemawat discusses the contrast
between commitment and flexibility (Ghemawat and del Sol, 1998). Only recently, largely in
response to the popularity of the Lean Startup movement, the literature has discussed this
dichotomy in the context of starting a business. Among the first to prompt this conversation, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2017) view the strategy process in entrepreneurial ventures
as a combination of “doing” and “thinking”.
While the academic literature recently started to explore this topic, there has been little systematic analysis of experimentation in entrepreneurship. Consequently, while the learning
benefits of experimentation are mostly undisputed, our understanding about its boundary
conditions is still limited. As a first step in filling this gap, this dissertation investigates
the role of experimentation in early-stage ventures, proposing a theoretical framework and
testing its main components.

1

1.2. Related Literature
This dissertation draws on three research traditions within the broader strategic management literature: entrepreneurship, organizational learning, and product development.
Historically, the literature on entrepreneurship has viewed new venture creation as a rational process of searching and exploiting an opportunity (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).
Perhaps closer to the way we view entrepreneurship today, Sarasvathy (2001) introduces
the notion of “effectuation”. More recent work has highlighted the importance of experimentation in entrepreneurship (Murray and Tripsas, 2004; Kerr et al., 2014; Manso, 2016).
Currently, a growing literature is examining experimentation in the effort to offer broader
conceptualizations of entrepreneurial strategy (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2017; Gans et al.,
2019).
The literature on organizational learning has investigated different types of learning processes. An important stream of work has analyzed the tradeoff between exploration and
exploitation. In a classic contribution, March (1991) emphasizes how organizational processes relying on exploitation more than on exploration may be effective in the short term
but self-destructive in the long term. A series of studies has refined and developed this view
theoretically and empirically (Gupta et al., 2006). In a perspective perhaps closer to my
dissertation, Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) examine forward-looking and backward-looking
search processes.
Finally, an important body of work informing this dissertation is the literature on product
development (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Schilling and Hill, 1998; Krishnan and Ulrich,
2001). In particular, a stream of research has examined the choice of acquiring and incorporating information during the development process. Thomke (1998, 2001) conceptualizes
different modes of experimentation in the product development process. MacCormack et al.
(2001) discuss the importance of flexible product development in settings of rapid technological change.

1.3. Methodology
I employed multiple methodological approaches throughout this dissertation1 .
The theoretical work, combining the existing literature and the insights from the qualitative
data, employs both a verbal approach and a formal approach. The verbal approach seeks to
offer a broad and comprehensive conceptualization of experimentation. The formal approach
1

I used a series of software packages. The model computation was executed using MATLAB 9.2. The
statistical analysis was executed using STATA MP 15.1. The document was typed using TeXworks 0.6.2
and the bibliography via Mendeley Desktop 1.19.2.

2

helps to clarify the key ideas and obtain testable implications (Adner et al., 2009).
The empirical work uses microeconometrics techniques, including panel regressions, differencein-differences regressions, and statistical matching. The core data in Chapters 4 and 5 were
collected using the approach of content analysis (Krippendorff, 2013).
This dissertation is largely guided by qualitative work. I conducted a series of semistructured
interviews to direct the investigation and then validate the findings. The first wave –
between Summer 2016 and Summer 2017 – involved 24 interviews, seeking to identify the
key tensions that arise in the context of experimentation. The second wave – in Spring
2018 – involved 12 interviews, seeking to validate the findings that emerged in the empirical
work. I personally conducted all the interviews, either on the phone or in person. All
interviewees were cofounders or top managers of early-stage ventures in software, hardware,
or biotechnology. Also for qualitative purposes, I ran a survey with the ventures in the
sample used in Chapter 5. The survey2 collected information about ventures’ strategy and
performance, seeking to infer the rationale for their choices around experimentation.

1.4. Overview
The dissertation contains six chapters beyond this Introduction. Chapter 2 offers a framework conceptualizing experimentation in early-stage ventures. Chapter 3 formalizes its key
components into a stylized model. Chapters 4 and 5 test the key insights of the theoretical
work. Chapter 6 discusses contributions to research, implications for practice, and open
questions. Chapter 7 contains the Appendix.
Chapter 2 develops a conceptual framework defining the construct and examining the factors
driving its impact. I define experimentation as disclosing an incomplete product to obtain
market feedback. This definition is essentially the notion of “minimum viable product”
(henceforth, MVP) used by practitioners. I argue that learning, adaptation, and appropriability are the primary factors driving the effect of experimentation on value creation and
value capture.
Chapter 3 constructs a stylized model to illustrate the learning channel. Combining elements
of spatial differentiation and Bayesian learning, I describe a venture with an initial idea
facing the choice between direct entry and experimental entry. The key feature of the
model – the product location – is represented both in a discrete setting and in a continuous
setting. The model formalizes the notion that experimentation is optimal when market
uncertainty and signal precision are high. Furthermore, it produces theoretical implications
2
The survey was approved by the University of Pennsylvania’s Institutional Review Board in June 2018.
It had a 6% response rate (67 responses).
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about the role of adaptation costs and appropriability concerns.
Chapter 4 explores the adaptation channel. A central driver of adaptation capability is
organizational structure. I hypothesize that experimentation requires low formal structure,
while planning is best combined with high formal structure. I test this argument on a
proprietary dataset of venture pitches from a university-based venture competition. If
evaluators are sensitive to this complementarity, teams combining experimentation and
low formal structure or planning and high formal structure should receive more positive
evaluations than those displaying alternative combinations. The analysis reveals robust
correlations consistent with the argument.
Chapter 5 examines the appropriability channel. Ventures are able to appropriate value
if they can effectively protect their intellectual property (henceforth, IP). They can rely
on formal IP (henceforth, FIP): legal tools such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
Alternatively, they can use informal IP (henceforth, IIP): strategic approaches such as
complexity, lead time, and partners’ netwokrs. Because IIP is typically accumulated after
product launch, I hypothesize that, when FIP is weak, the learning benefits of experimentation may be offset by the expropriation risks. I test this argument on a hand-collected
dataset of more than 1,200 US-based software ventures, exploiting the software release life
cycle terminology to measure experimentation and the US Supreme Court landmark ruling
Alice Corp vs CLS Bank International (henceforth, Alice) as a negative shock to patent
protection. Following the ruling, the affected ventures are less likely to engage in experimentation. This effect is weaker for ventures with strong incentive to learn and stronger
for venture facing intense competition.
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CHAPTER 2 : Conceptualizing Experimentation in Early-Stage Ventures
2.1. Question
This chapter examines the primary factors driving the value of experimentation3 . I propose
a conceptual framework to illustrate the firm capabilities and the environmental characteristics that explain the effect of experimentation on venture performance.
I offer a definition of experimentation based on the current practitioners’ usage: the process
of disclosing an incomplete version of the product in order to collect market feedback. With
this definition, drawing on a variety of streams of research in strategic management, I suggest
that three factors play a central role in driving the value of experimentation: learning,
adaptation, and appropriability. To summarize this discussion, I propose a conceptual
framework and a series of testable implications.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical context that led to
the emergence of experimentation as a common practice in entrepreneurship. Section 3
defines the construct and provides a taxonomy. Sections 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the three
channels: learning, adaptation, and appropriability. Section 7 summarizes these insights
into a conceptual framework. Section 8 concludes by discussing limitations and next steps.

2.2. Emergence of Experimentation-Driven Entrepreneurship
The current practice of entrepreneurship views product market experimentation as the optimal approach to starting a new venture. This principle is promoted by a large practitioneroriented literature, including Highsmith and Cockburn (2001), Blank (2005), Blank and
Dorf (2012), Ries (2011, 2017), McGrath and MacMillan (2009), Aulet (2013), and Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010). In particular, the work by Ries – his 2011 book The Lean
Startup and his blogging activity – is largely responsible for initiating this perspective. By
popularizing concepts such as MVP and pivoting, the Lean Startup has institutionalized
the practice of commercializing early-stage products for learning purposes.
Naturally, the emergence of experimentation is, at least partially, a response to a set of
economic and technological forces which have diminished the upfront cost of experimenting
(Contigiani and Levinthal, 2019). Traditionally, building and distributing a product was
costly and time-consuming, and thus required substantial planning efforts. Today, it is
cheaper and faster, making experimentation a substantially more viable route.
3

This chapter is based on working paper ”Toward a Theory of Experimentation in Early-Stage Ventures”.
JP Eggers, David Hall, Aseem Kaul, and Sandeep Pillai provided helpful feedback.
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I categorize these forces into four families: cost of product development, cost of product
distribution, cost of human capital, and cost of financial capital. Figure 1 reports the key
events contributing to these trends.
Figure 1: Historical Context

This figure illustrates the main events that contributed to the decrease of the cost of experimentation for early-stage
ventures during the past two decades.

First, the cost of product development has dropped. In the software sector, the open source
movement (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Lerner and Tirole, 2005) has given entrepreneurs access
to software capabilities that were previously unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Similarly, the emergence of cloud-based computing now allows ventures to avoid large hardware
investments for data processing and storing (Ewens et al., 2018). Similarly, in the hardware sector, the emergence of rapid prototyping techniques (Barkan and Iansiti, 1993) –
such as computer-aided technologies (CAD, CAM, CAE) and 3D printing – have allowed
entrepreneurs to build prototypes with minimal initial investments.
Second, there has been a sharp decrease in the cost of distributing products, especially
in the software sector. The emergence of the commercial Internet in 1995 (Greenstein,
2010) provided a new massive platform to quickly and cheaply distribute software products.
The popularization of the smartphone in the late 2000s (DeGusta, 2012) has created an
additional channel through which software can be used and distributed cheaply. In addition,
the advent of “big data” and AI during the past decade has provided a largely novel toolkit
to collect and analyze data, substantially increasing the quantity and quality of feedback
ventures can collect from their customers, and thus making experimentation more valuable.
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Third, the advances in communication technologies and the lowering of cross-country barriers of the past two decades have made offshoring an option for entrepreneurs, allowing
them to relocate production in countries with a low cost of labor. This fact has involved
also science and engineering human capital (Stephan et al., 2008), particularly critical to
early-stage ventures. This trend was enhanced by the emergence of online marketplaces –
platforms like Upwork – that has made access to skilled labor cheap and efficient.
Finally, access to financial capital has become cheaper. Funding for early-stage firms,
traditionally restricted to venture capital, now includes a variety of other options. A critical
contributor to this trend has been the emergence of crowdfunding platforms (Mollick, 2014;
Mollick and Robb, 2016).

2.3. Defining Experimentation
Entrepreneurial learning can take place in multiple ways. Miner et al. (2001) study how
entrepreneurs learn through improvisation. Srinivasan et al. (2007) investigate vicarious
learning, the process of learning through observation. Cohen et al. (2018) examine how
entrepreneurs learn through interaction with mentors, or consultative learning. Chatterji
et al. (2019) explore how entrepreneurs learn from interacting with their peers. Another
form of learning is learning through experimentation.
In defining a notion of experimentation in entrepreneurship, it is helpful to start from
the philosophy of science. Experimentation is a method to learn through some form of
intervention on the environment. Hacking (1983), a leading philosopher of the 20th century,
writes:
Science is said to have two aims: theory and experiment. Theories try to say
how the world is. Experiment and subsequent technology change the world. We
represent and we intervene. We represent in order to intervene, and we intervene
in the light of representations.
The distinctive element of experimentation – and what makes it different from other forms
of learning – is the intervention. Learning based on the pure observation of the world –
without intervention – is therefore not experimentation.
The strategic management literature has explored different ways through which organizations learn (Bingham and Davis, 2012). Murray and Tripsas (2004) are perhaps the first to
conceptualize learning through experimentation in entrepreneurial firms:
We define purposeful experimentation specifically as the application of the “scientific method” by entrepreneurs to key parameters of their business. Thus
7

a purposeful experiment involves the development of a hypothesis about the
business, the performance of a specific test, and the analysis of the results.
This view is consistent with the notion of experimentation currently popular among practitioners. In the age of the Lean Startup, experimentation is primarily embodied in the
concept of the minimum viable product. Ries (2017) defines the MVP as follows:
An MVP is an early version of a new product that allows a team to collect the
maximum amount of validated learning (learning based on real data gathering
rather than guesses about the future) about customers. Ideally, this learning
will maximize the number of leap-of-faith assumptions tested while minimizing
cost, time, and effort.
Building on this perspective, I define experimentation in the context of the life cycle of an
emerging firm. A venture begins when a founding team identifies an opportunity, generates
an idea, and decides to establish an organization to pursue it (Shane and Venkataraman,
2000; Alvarez et al., 2013). An idea is essentially a set of beliefs and hypotheses (Felin and
Zenger, 2017; Camuffo et al., 2018) about how a product creates value and how the firm
captures it. Once the venture commits to the idea, it assembles the necessary resources
to build the product (Clough et al., 2019). After the product development process, it
commercializes the product and seeks to scale (Eisenmann et al., 2012; DeSantola and
Gulati, 2017).
Through the response of the market, the venture obtains feedback, and possibly adapts
by modifying the product over time. However, the venture can choose to get feedback
and adapt prior to commercialization, through the process of experimentation. I define an
experiment as the disclosure of an incomplete product in order to obtain market feedback.
Hence, ventures circulating incomplete products – MVPs, beta versions, prototypes, pilots,
and so on – for learning purposes are viewed as experimenting.
This process can take a variety of forms. I provide a taxonomy of experimentation strategies
along the following criteria: the level, the size, and the mode.
Starting from the level, experimentation can affect the entire product or just specific components of the product (Murray and Tripsas, 2004). Architectural experimentation (Henderson
and Clark, 1990) occurs at the high level, involves the overall product, and often affects the
underlying business model the venture is developing. Modular experimentation occurs at
lower levels, affecting only specific features4 .
4
This notion of experimentation often takes the form of AB testing (Kohavi et al., 2012; Azevedo et al.,
2019). AB testing involves running randomized trials to measure the causal effects of one or more well-
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In terms of size, ventures can experiment sequentially or in parallel (Murray and Tripsas,
2004). Size, in this context, defines the number of initiatives along which the experimentation process takes place. Sequential experimentation is the act of experimenting along one
unique initiative at each point in time. Parallel experimentation (Nelson, 1961) is the act
of experimenting along multiple initiatives at the same time.
In terms of mode, experimentation can be structured or unstructured. Structured experimentation follows closely the scientific method, formulating explicit hypotheses ex ante and
uses the experiment to falsify them (Camuffo et al., 2018). Unstructured experimentation is
the process of obtaining information through an intervention when the hypotheses guiding
the action are mostly implicit or undefined.
Experimentation in early-stage ventures typically involves the entire product, because it is
the basic value proposition that needs to be tested. Given the resource constraints, experimentation primarily proceeds along one single direction. Despite doing so would improve
their performance (Camuffo et al., 2018), entrepreneurs rarely use an explicit hypothesistesting approach. Hence, the experimentation process discussed in this work is primarily
architectural, sequential, and unstructured.
Ultimately, experimentation is a strategic choice that ventures make. In some cases, ventures they may choose to take this route, and get feedback prior to commercializing and
scaling – I will call this “experimental entry”. In other cases, they may choose not to experiment, commercializing the product without prior market feedback – I will call this “direct
entry”.
Entrepreneurs pursue experimentation when they expect this action to increase their expected performance. Throughout this work, I will define performance as value captured
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Gans and Ryall, 2017). I argue that three primary
channels drive the impact of experimentation on value capture: learning, adaptation, and
appropriability. I will discuss each channel in the remainder of this chapter.

2.4. Learning
Through the circulation of early-stage products to the market, ventures learn and have the
opportunity to adapt prior to making large investments. This learning process is experiential
(Levinthal and March, 1981; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) and intentional (Murray and
Tripsas, 2004). The knowledge obtained is primarily about the preference structure of the
defined features of a product. While important, this type of experimentation is less relevant to early-stage
entrepreneurship because 1) it requires a large experimental population and 2) is effective when the core of
the business idea has been defined. These conditions rarely hold in early-stage ventures.
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target customer group (Lynn et al., 1996). The information originates in the feedback offered
by customers, so this process is akin to phenomena such as “learning by using” (Rosenberg,
1983; Mukoyama, 2006) and “user innovation” (von Hippel, 1986; Gambardella et al., 2017).
This reduces the distance between the offered product and the desired product, improving
the degree of “fit” between product and market5 .
We can view the value a product creates for the buyer as a function of two components: fit
with the buyer’s needs and technological quality of the product6 . By putting effort on experimentation, the venture obtains information about the market, thus increasing fit. Because
many of the venture’s resources – primarily, human capital and financial capital – are not
scale-free (Levinthal and Wu, 2010), this implies putting less effort on quality. This creates
what I will refer to as the “fit-quality tradeoff”. Therefore, the value of experimentation
depends on the relative importance of fit versus quality in the target market.
The importance of fit and quality depends on where the “potential amount of learning” is
greater. In other words, it depends on the nature of the uncertainty, a pervasive feature of
the entrepreneurial process (Packard et al., 2017). Generally speaking, uncertainty stems
from two fundamental sources: the supply side (technological uncertainty) or the demand
side (market uncertainty). Learning through experimentation is effective when there is
substantial uncertainty around the demand. In such a scenario, without learning, the
venture is unlikely to build a product with high a degree of fit. Hence, when uncertainty is
mostly on the demand side, experimentation has a positive impact on value creation. This
discussion leads to the following statement.
Proposition 2.1. The value of learning depends on the nature of the uncertainty because
of resource finiteness and fit-quality tradeoff. High market uncertainty increases the value
of experimentation.
Beyond the tradeoff between reducing market uncertainty relative to technology uncertainty,
the learning process may be more or less effective. In other words, experimentation is
valuable only if the venture has sufficient “learning capability”.
The management literature has emphasized that organizations differ in their ability to
absorb external information. Such ability is known as absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989, 1990, 1994). While absorptive capacity is largely the result of past investments and therefore is positively correlated with firm age, nascent firms may differ in terms
5
The term product-market fit was popularized by VC investor Marc Andreessen. You can see his 2007
blog post at https://pmarchive.com/guide to startups part4.html.
6
While this view has not been explored in the strategy literature, Hsu et al. (2009) propose a theory of
category spanning where the “actual appeal” of a given product is the function of “intrinsic appeal” and
“engagement”, respectively akin to quality and fit.
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of this ability. In particular, the experience of the founding team (Beckman, 2006) is likely
to play an important role in driving the venture’s learning capability. Having market-specific
knowledge is likely to affect their ability to assimilate external information7 .
Moreover, a stream of work starting with Levinthal and March (1993) has discussed multiple ways in which organizational learning can be noisy, ambiguous, and myopic (Eggers
and Kaplan, 2013). These challenges make the venture less effective in learning from experimentation. An important form of bias in this setting concerns the assumption that early
adopters – the group that tests the experimental product and generates market feedback –
are similar to the general population where the finished product will be commercialized, a
problem discussed in the classic work by Moore (1991). Hence, if the venture is unable to
choose the test market appropriately, it may receive misleading feedback from experimentation.
Overall, the effectiveness of the learning process depends on the venture’s ability to capture
and interpret the information. Ventures that are more capable of distinguishing signal from
noise in the market feedback gain from experimenting. This analysis leads to the following
statement.
Proposition 2.2. The effectiveness of the learning process depends on the venture’s learning capability. High learning capability increases the value of experimentation.

2.5. Adaptation
After receiving feedback, the information collected needs to be absorbed and incorporated
into the product through a process of adaptation. Adaptation beyond the simple optimizing
of certain features is what practitioners refer to as pivoting (Ries, 2011, 2017). This process
allows the venture to increase fit with the market and thus create more value.
However, adaptation is not cost-free. Costs may arise from multiple sources, such as product
change (Sanchez, 1995; MacCormack and Sturtevant, 2016) and organizational coordination
(Rawley, 2010). Hence, the venture’s ability to adapt – and thus incur lower adaptation
costs – is an important driver of the value of experimentation.
The nature of the product may be more or less subject to adaptation. The strategy literature
has explored the notion of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and Prencipe,
2001). Scarcely modular products are less subject to adaptation. In such cases, the costs
of reworking the product8 are high, making experimentation less viable. This discussion is
7
While there is not literature that specifically tests this fact, this idea is consistent with the literature on
entrepreneurial spawning (Agarwal et al., 2004; Gompers et al., 2005; De Figueiredo et al., 2013)
8
This idea is akin to the notion of “technological debt”, well known in the software space.
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summarized by the following statement.
Proposition 2.3. The adaptation process is effective if the product has a modular structure.
High product modularity increases the value of experimentation.
Beyond product structure, the ability to adapt is also a function of organizational structure. A long tradition in organizational theory has emphasized the role of formal structure
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Volberda et al., 2012; Van de Ven et al., 2013) in driving the
likelihood and ease of organizational change.
Since the work of Burns and Stalker (1961), high formal structure (“bureaucratic organizations”) is believed to be optimal for static environments and low formal structure (“organic
organizations”) for dynamic environments. More recently, however, Sine et al. (2006) have
studied the role of structure in early-stage ventures, suggesting that high formalization increase venture performance in turbulent environments. Hence, there is no strong agreement
on the role of formal structure in early-stage ventures.
I propose that the role of formal structure depends on the strategy the venture employs.
Experimentation requires a structure that can effectively and quickly incorporate feedback
by modifying the product. This is likely to be best achieved by a low degree of formalization
(Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). This discussion leads to the following statement.
Proposition 2.4. The adaptation process is effective if the organization has an organizational structure that efficiently incorporates new information. High formal structure decreases the value of experimentation.

2.6. Appropriability
While experimentation drives value creation through learning and adaptation, it may also
affect the value capture phase. When ventures seek market feedback through experimentation, they expose their idea to the market, incurring the risk of replication, imitation, or
other forms of misappropriation (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006; Katila et al., 2008).
In absence of strong barriers to imitation, experimentation may induce entry from potential
competitors9 . Other firms – especially those that possess the capabilities and the complementary assets relevant to the product – could choose to enter, eroding the value created
by the venture.
9
Experimentation typically does not include complementary investments in marketing, so does not credibly play a preemptive function or create substantial switching costs. Hence, experimentation does not create
first-mover advantage in the traditional sense (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Suarez and Lanzolla,
2007). It may instead create a second-mover advantage for the entrant that observes the venture’s learning
process (Hawk et al., 2013).
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The likelihood that a competitor enters in response to the venture’s experimentation effort
is a function of the degree to which the feedback is observable to outsiders10 . If it is easily
observable, positive feedback induces potential competitors to enter, and this decreases the
venture’s appropriability. This scenario is summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 2.5. Experimentation decreases appropriability if the market feedback is easily
observable to outsiders. High feedback observability decreases the value of experimentation.
Firms can alleviate the threat of imitation through the use of IP protection. The literature (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Graham et al., 2009; Alcacer et al., 2017) has
documented that firms use diversified portfolios of IP tools, combining formal and informal mechanisms (Hall et al., 2014). FIP includes legal tools such as patents, copyrights,
trademarks (Ramello and Silva, 2006), and secrecy (Png, 2017a,b; Contigiani et al., 2018).
IIP includes strategic tools such as complexity (Szulanski, 1996; Rivkin, 2000), lead time,
capital requirements, and partners’ network positions (Hallen et al., 2014).
While new ventures also choose their appropriability regime strategically (Gans and Stern,
2017; Ching et al., 2018), they may not have access to the entire portfolio of IP tools. In
particular, IIP is generally accumulated over time11 . Typically, ventures make substantial
marketing investments when launching their products. These marketing efforts – including
public relations, advertising, and media presence – may lead to the creation of complementary assets (Teece, 1986), such as brand recognition and customer base, that generate
IIP.
On the other hand, prior to making large investments into commercialization, the primary
form of protection is likely to be FIP. Ventures can rely on FIP – especially patenting
(Acemoglu et al., 2011) – to protect their experimentation process. Hence, ventures capture value if the FIP regime is sufficiently strong. This discussion leads to the following
statement.
Proposition 2.6. Experimentation decreases appropriability if IP protection is weak. Strong
FIP increases the value of experimentation.
10
Besides affecting appropriability, the observability of the feedback may create reputational effects (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Reputation is particularly important for early-stage firms, because it may help
alleviate asymmetric information between entrepreneur and stakeholders (Hsu, 2004) and compensate for the
liability of newness (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). While informative, obtaining negative feedback may generate
a negative reputation. This effect is particularly strong if the negative reputation is “sticky” and does not
quickly vanish, as may be the case in markets with well established rating systems (Chatterji and Toffel,
2010).
11
Naturally, there may be heterogeneity in the degree of IIP even early on. Some early-stage ventures
may have higher IIP than others. For example, ventures building more complex products (Szulanski, 1996;
Rivkin, 2000) have higher IIP and are less likely to be easily imitated.

13

2.7. Conceptual Framework
I have argued that the choice of experimentation impacts value through three main channels: learning, adaptation, and appropriability. The impact of each channel depends on
a variety of firm capabilities and environmental characteristics. The learning benefits of
experimentation increase with market uncertainty and with learning capability. Its adaptation costs decrease with product modularity and increase with formal structure. The
associated threats to appropriability increase with feedback observability and decrease with
strong FIP.
The combined effect of experimentation on performance depends on the composition of these
effects. I summarize this discussion into a simple conceptual model reported in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework

This figure illustrates the conceptual framework proposed in this chapter. Each arrow represents one of the three
channels: learning, adaptation, and appropriability. The effect of each channel is driven by two moderating factors.

2.8. Discussion
I conclude by discussing the key limitations of this study and how to address them in
creating a more complete theory of experimentation in early-stage ventures.
The discussion identifies a series of factors that drive the performance of experimentation.
While theorizing about the individual effects, I do not emphasize their interactions. However, it is possible that some of the factors discussed may affect channels other than the
14

primary channel hypothesized here. For example, the first order effect of product modularity is to facilitate adaptation to market feedback. However, modularity may also affect
appropriability by increasing the threat of imitation (Pil and Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj et al.,
2008). Hence, a more complete conceptualization of experimentation should carefully investigate the interaction effects among the key factors driving learning, adaptation, and
appropriability.
Furthermore, this study has primarily focused on the short-term performance of the venture
– the value created by its first product. Early experimentation may also affect the trajectory
of a firm in the long run. The early stage of a new venture is a period in which events,
decisions, and initiatives may have a long-lasting effect on the future (Johnson, 2007).
Early-stage experimentation may lead the venture to develop experimentation-supporting
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and thus higher flexibility in the long run. If the venture
operates in particularly turbulent markets, this may have a positive effect on its longterm performance. Besides influencing future organizational structure, experimentation
may affect its decision-making. Depending on the location of the initial idea and the nature
of the feedback received, the venture may choose to adapt “locally” and position into a
“local peak” (Levinthal, 1997). Locating into a local peak may make it more vulnerable to
radical changes, and this may be detrimental in the long term12 . Hence, it is useful to also
consider the long-term implications of early-stage experimentation.
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Consistent with this idea, Thiel and Masters (2014) write, “Making small changes to things that already
exist might lead you to a local maximum, but it won’t help you find the global maximum.”
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CHAPTER 3 : A Model of Experimentation and Learning
3.1. Question
This chapter examines the role of learning in driving the value of experimentation13 . Following the discussion in the previous chapter, I propose a stylized model describing a venture
choosing between direct entry and experimental entry to illustrate the relationship between
learning and performance.
The model is a single-agent decision problem combining a spatial framework and a Bayesian
framework. The agent is a venture with an initial idea seeking to develop and commercialize
a product. The spatial framework is a way to capture the notion of “product-market fit”, the
distance between the product offering and the customers’ need. The Bayesian framework is
a way to describe the learning process taking place through experimentation. The venture
can choose one of two strategies: direct entry or experimental entry. Direct entry involves
developing the initial idea without gathering additional information. Experimental entry
involves getting market feedback through experimentation during the product development
process and adapting accordingly.
I present the model both in a discrete setting and in a continuous setting. The discrete
setting provides a clearer intuition, while allowing lower flexibility in defining some of the
features of the problem. The continuous setting allows me to incorporate the notion of
distance directly, but produces less intuitive insights.
The model illustrates that the optimal choice is driven by the value of acquiring information:
a function of market uncertainty, learning capability, and upfront cost of experimenting
Furthermore, costly adaptation and weak appropriability contribute to the decision-making
process by lowering the value of experimentation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the framework with discrete product
location, illustrating the relationship between market uncertainty and value of experimentation. Section 3 describes the framework with continuous product location, illustrating
the role of market uncertainty and signal precision. Sections 4 and 5 add the features of
adaptation cost and appropriability. Section 5 concludes by discussing limitations and next
steps.
13

This chapter is based on working paper ”A Model of Experimentation and Learning in Early-Stage
Ventures”. Alessandro Bravetti, Francesca Brusa, Fabrizio Dell’Acqua, Simone Emiliozzi, Ilwoo Hwang,
Nicola Lacetera, Dan Levinthal, Tong Liu, Marco Grotteria, Matteo Sordello, Ruslan Sverchkov, and Hongyu
Xiao provided helpful feedback.
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3.2. Discrete Product Location
A venture seeks to develop and commercialize a product starting from an initial idea. It
chooses strategy S 14 , where S ∈ {S1 , S2 }. By pursuing S1 , it develops the product
based on the initial idea (direct entry, DE). By pursuing S2 , it collects market feedback
by experimenting with an early-stage product, decides whether to adapt, and then launches
(experimental entry, XE). The venture chooses the optimal strategy by comparing the
expected values of each strategy.
The key element of the model is product location L. In this discrete setting, there are
two possible locations, L ∈ {A, B}. I assume, without loss of generality, that the venture
initial idea is to place the product in location A. Upon experimenting, it decides whether
to maintain location A or move to location B.
The location drives the return: the market prefers one location over the other. I model this
feature assuming that each location has a probability of success. Location A has probability
P R(A) = p Location B has probability P R(B) = 1 − p. In other words, P R(L) determines
the chance that L is indeed the right location. If the location is right, the venture receives
payoff π > 0. If it is wrong, it receives payoff 0.
The ex-post payoff function is the following15 :
Π(L, p, S ) = W (L, p) − k(S ) = P R(L)π − k(S )

π > 0 is the profit if location L is correct. k(S ) is the upfront cost of experimentation:
it equals 0 in case of DE and k > 0 in case of XE. This payoff function implies that the
venture is risk neutral16 .
Therefore, if the venture chooses S1 , the payoff is Π(L, p, S1 ) = W (L, p) = P R(L)π. If it
chooses S2 , the payoff is Π(L, p, S2 ) = W (L, p) − k(S2 ) = P R(L)π − k.
Success probability p is unknown. Hence, P is a random variable and p is its realized
value17 . By choosing S1 , the venture relies on its original perspective on P . By choosing
S2 , it receives additional information about P and can improve its perspective. I model
Symbol S is pronounced “script S”.
A natural component of the payoff function would be development cost d. This cost does not affect the
result, because it is incurred in both strategies. Hence, to simplify, I assume d = 0.
16
In contrast to the continuous version of this model, where the variance plays a role because of risk
aversion, here the variance matters because it is part of the payoff, due to the structure of the signal.
17
Following the standard notation, I will be denoting a random variable with an upper-case letter and a
realization of the random variable with a lower-case letter.
14
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this learning process in a Bayesian fashion, following the structure proposed by Cohen and
Levinthal (1994)18 .
I assume the venture has prior belief fP (p)19 with expected value µ and variance σ 2 . While
not strictly necessary for the argument, a convenient form to define f (p) is the beta distribution20 . Consistent with the idea that A is the starting location, I assume the prior
expected probability of success is higher for A than for alternative location B, so µ ∈ [0.5, 1].
Naturally, σ 2 > 0.
After choosing XE, the venture receives a signal S that takes two values, hence S ∈ {Â, B̂}.
The signal provides noisy information on which location might be the right one. For example, the signal might indicate that the right location is A – that is, S = Â – but the actual
location may still be B. I assume that the signal S has the following distribution21 :
P R(S = Â|P = p) = pθ + µ(1 − θ)
P R(S = B̂|P = p) = (1 − p)θ + (1 − µ)(1 − θ)
θ ∈ (0, 1] – which, loosely speaking, could be viewed as the signal precision – determines
the amount of actual information contained in the signal. While its informativeness varies,
assuming θ > 0 implies that the signal is never completely uninformative.
Upon receiving signal S from the market, the venture updates its belief. Using Bayes Rule22 ,
the resulting posterior belief can be shown to be:
fP (p|S = Â) =

f (p) P R(S = Â|P = p)
µ

fP (p|S = B̂) =

f (p) P R(S = B̂|P = p)
1−µ
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I model the uncertainty around the product location by assuming each location has a probability of
success but such probability is unknown. This approach is similar to Cohen and Levinthal (1994) and
Manso (2011). In this framework, the uncertainty is on the probability. An alternative approach would be
to model uncertainty directly on the location. Each location has a known probability of being the right
one. The signal indicates which location may be right and is correct with some known probability. While
conceptually simpler, this approach results in more complicated algebra.
19
Hence, fP (p) is the probability density function of random variable P , with P taking values between 0
and 1.
20
The beta distribution is a continuous probability distribution defined in interval [0, 1] and determined
a
by two parameters a > 0 and b > 0. The mean is a+b
.
. The variance is (a+b)2ab
(a+b+1)
21
If we assume Â = 1 and B̂ = 0, this is a Bernoully distribution with parameter pθ + µ(1 − θ).
22
Given continuous random variable X and discrete random variable Y, Bayes Rule states that fX|Y =y (x) =
fX (x)P (Y =y|X=x)
.
P (Y =y)
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Using the posterior beliefs, I calculate the conditional expectation of P for each value of
the signal. For convenience, I will be defining Q =

σ2 θ
µ

and T =

σ2 θ
1−µ .

The conditional

expectation of p for each value of the signal can be calculated to be the following:
E(P |S = Â) = µ +

E(P |S = B̂) = µ −

σ2θ
=µ+Q
µ
σ2θ
=µ−T
1−µ

Hence, E(P |S = Â) and E(P |S = B̂) can be viewed as the estimates of location A’s
probability of success p after the two possible values of the signal23 . In other words, once it
receives the signal, the venture updates its view on p to be E(P |S = Â) if it received signal
S = Â and E(P |S = B̂) if it received signal S = B̂.
The model goes as follows. At time 0, the venture has a prior belief about the success
probability of the default location A. It chooses DE or XE. By choosing XE, it receives
signal S and updates its belief. At time 1, whichever choice it made at time 0, it chooses
the final product location: staying in A or moving to B. Figure 3 illustrates the sequence
of events.
Figure 3: Timeline of Discrete Location Model

This figure illustrates the model timeline. At time 0, the venture chooses between DE and XE. At time 1, it chooses
the final location of the product, utilizing the information available. At time 2, it receives the payoff.

I assume that the venture chooses its strategy ex ante by comparing the expected payoffs of
S1 and S2 . Proceeding by backward induction, I solve the model by taking the following
three steps:
23

While this may not be immediately visible, if we assume a Beta distribution, E(P |S = Â) and E(P |S =
B̂) are inside the interval [0, 1] as we would expect. E(P |S = Â) is clearly always bigger than 0 and can be
shown to be never bigger than 1. E(P |S = B̂) is clearly never bigger than 1 and can be shown to be never
smaller than 0. Both cases can be easily analyzed by assuming the “worst case scenario” value θ = 1 and
substituting the expressions of mean and variance of a Beta distribution with parameters a > 0 and b > 0.
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1. At the node following DE (node 1), I calculate the final product location L∗ by
comparing the expected payoffs of choosing A and choosing B. The expectation over
P is taken using the prior distribution. I obtain the expected payoff π1 .
2. At the node following XE (node 2), I calculate the final product location L∗∗ by comparing the expected payoffs of choosing A and choosing B for each signal s. The
expectation over P is taken using the posterior distribution given signal s. I then
take a second expectation, calculating the expected value before receiving the signal,
weighing each signal-specific expected payoff by the probability of receiving the corresponding signal. Finally, because the probability of receiving the signal is a function
of p, I take a third expectation, using the prior distribution. I obtain the expected
payoff π2 .
3. At the initial node (node 0), I compare expected payoffs π1 and π2 . Experimentation
is optimal if the expected payoff π2 exceeds the expected payoff π1 .
Figure 4 summarizes the model via a decision tree.
Figure 4: Decision Tree of Discrete Location Model

This figure illustrates the model timeline. At time 0, the venture chooses between DE and XE. At time 1, it chooses
the final location of the product, utilizing the information available. At time 2, it receives the payoff.

Using this framework, I examine the optimal strategy as function of market uncertainty σ 2 .
The process outlined in the previous section leads to the following statement.
Proposition 3.1. Experimental entry XE is optimal when parameters σ 2 , k, and θ satisfy
the following condition:
σ 2 ≥ G(µ, θ) +
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k
2θπ

where G(µ, θ) =

3µ−2µ2 −1
.
2θ

Market uncertainty σ 2 determines the choice between DE and XE, and the product location
at each of the possible three nodes. For σ 2 ∈ (0, G(µ, θ)), pivoting to B is never optimal, and
k
), pivoting to B is optimal after
DE is the optimal strategy. For σ 2 ∈ [G(µ, θ), G(µ, θ) + 2θπ
k
signal S = B̂, but DE is still the optimal strategy. For σ 2 ≥ G(µ, θ) + 2θπ
, pivoting to B is

optimal after signal B̂, and XE becomes the optimal strategy. This statement formalizes
the notion that experimentation is optimal when market uncertainty σ 2 is sufficiently high.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Furthermore, cost of experimentation k and signal precision θ affect the cutoff in intuitive
ways. Experimentation cost k positively affects the cutoff: as k increases, the minimum σ 2
that makes experimentation optimal increases. Conversely, θ enters the cutoff inversely: as
θ increases, the minimum σ 2 making experimentation optimal diminishes.

3.3. Continuous Product Location
I develop a continuous version of the previous model. Product location is now a continuous
variable24 . A venture seeks to develop and commercialize product a starting from initial
idea i. Both initial idea i and final location a are assumed to be points in the real-valued
line R25 . The location drives the return.
The rest of the model is as before. The venture chooses strategy S ∈ {S1 , S2 }. By
pursuing S1 , it develops i and launches (direct entry, DE). By pursuing S2 , it collects
market feedback by experimenting with an early-stage product, adapts, and then launches
(experimental entry, XE). It chooses the optimal strategy by comparing the expected
values of each strategy.
The ex-post payoff function is the following26 :


Π(a, z, S ) = W (a, z) − k(S ) = α − β(a − z)2 − k(S )
24
While this model is inspired by the Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1929), the interpretation is a bit different.
In Hotelling, buyers are evenly dispersed along a segment, and they are identical except for their location.
While buyers are not explicitly modelled, I essentially assume that buyers are identical in terms of location
but have different preferences over the various locations. There is a specific point – market peak z – which is
the most preferred point. A location in the line can be seen as a vector of features of the product. I assume
a vector of dimension 1 for simplicity, but naturally one could consider a vector of dimension N. However,
while assuming a vector of dimension N would be more realistic, the algebra would be more complicated
and the basic intuition would be the same.
25
For simplicity, I assume no bounds to the line. This allows me to assume a normal distribution and
simplifies the algebra without any substantial loss in intuition.
26
As before, I assume no development cost, hence d = 0.

21

Willingness-to-pay W (a, z, S ) is negatively related to the distance between market peak
z and product location a (Habib et al., 2013). α > 0 is a parameter making the payoff
positive. β > 0 determines the sensitivity to the distance. k(S ) is the upfront cost of
experimentation: it equals 0 in case of DE and k > 0 in case of XE. This payoff function
implies that the venture is risk averse27 .


Therefore, if the venture chooses S1 , the payoff is Π(a, z, S1 ) = W (a, z) = α − β(a − z)2 .


If it chooses S2 , the payoff is Π(a, z, S2 ) = W (a, z) − k = α − β(a − z)2 − k.
The market peak is unknown, so Z is a random variable and z its realized value. By choosing
S1 , the venture relies on its original perspective on Z. By choosing S2 , it may improve it
by getting additional information. I model this learning process in a Bayesian fashion.
I assume the venture has a prior belief over market peak Z of the following form:
Z ∼ N (i, σ 2 ) = N (i, δ −1 )

Initial idea i is assumed to be the mean of the prior distribution. Variance σ 2 = δ −1 can be
viewed as a measure of market uncertainty28 . Accordingly, prior precision δ measures the
accuracy of the venture’s prior.
Conditional on choosing XE, the venture receives a signal S = Z + , where  ∼ N (0, θ−1 ).
Therefore, signal S is distributed as follows:
S|Z ∼ N (Z, θ−1 )
Precision θ can be viewed as the venture’s capability to capture and interpret the information received from the market (Arora and Gambardella, 1994).
Upon receiving signal s from the market, the venture updates its belief. The resulting
posterior belief (Veldkamp, 2011) takes the following form:

Z|S ∼ N

θ
1
δ
i+
s,
δ+θ
δ+θ δ+θ



1
σ2


=N

1
σ2

+θ

i+

θ
s,
1
+
θ
2
σ

1
1
+θ
σ2



For simplicity, I will define M = δ + θ. Hence, given signal s, the conditional expectation
of Z is

δ
Mi

+

θ
Ms

and its conditional variance is
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1
M.

The second derivative of the ex-post payoff function with respect to a is −2β < 0.
I will interpret prior variance σ 2 as an environmental factor. However, one could view it also as an
idiosyncratic feature of the venture. Better entrepreneurs might have more accurate views of their target
markets. Or, more interestingly, in a dynamic setting, serial entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs with experience
in the industry may have a more precise prior.
28
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At time 0, the venture has a belief about where Z may be located and wants to place the
product as close as possible to the true value of Z. Its initial idea is the expectation of its
prior distribution of Z. Given i, it chooses S1 or S2 . At time 1, whichever choice it made
at time 0, it chooses product location a. At time 2, z is revealed and the venture receives
its ex-post payoff. Figure 5 illustrates the sequence of events29 .
Figure 5: Timeline of Continuous Location Model

This figure illustrates the model timeline. At time 0, the venture chooses between DE and XE. At time 1, it chooses
the final location of the product, utilizing the information available. At time 2, it receives the payoff.

I assume that the venture chooses its path ex ante by comparing the expected payoffs of
strategies S1 and S2 . Accordingly, I solve the model by taking the following three steps:
1. At the node following DE (node 1), I calculate the location of the final product a∗ by
differentiating Ez [Π(a, z)] with respect to a. I then calculate the associated expected
payoff π1 = Ez [Π(a∗ , z)].
2. At the node following XE (node 2), I calculate the location of the final product a∗∗
differentiating Ez [Π(a, z)|s] with respect to a. I then calculate the associated expected
payoff Ez [Π(a∗∗ , z)|s]. Because this may be a function of s, I take the expectation using


the distribution of s, obtaining Es Ez [Π(a∗∗ , z)|z] . Because the resulting quantity
may be ha function of z, I take
the expectation using the prior distribution, obtaining

i
∗∗
π2 = Ez Es Ez [Π(a , z)|s] .
3. At the initial node (node 0), I compare expected payoffs π1 and π2 . Experimentation
is optimal if the expected payoff π2 exceeds the expected payoff π1 .
Figure 6 summarizes the model via a decision tree.
I start by examining how market uncertainty σ 2 and signal precision θ drive the venture’s
29
I could assume that, upon receiving the signal s, the venture has the option to abandon the project.
The solution of that model would be a cutoff s: if s ≥ s adapt and commercialize, if s < s abandon. This
feature complicates the algebra substantially, while adding little to the intuition.
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Figure 6: Decision Tree of Continuous Location Model

This figure illustrates the model timeline. At time 0, the venture chooses between DE and XE. At time 1, it chooses
the final location of the product, utilizing the information available. At time 2, it receives the payoff.

choice. The process outlined leads to the following statement.
Proposition 3.2. Experimental entry XE is optimal when parameters σ 2 , k, and θ satisfy
the following condition:
σ2 −

1
σ2

1
k
≥
β
+θ

given parameters α and β.
In this simple setting, the final product location chosen is simply the mean of Z, calculated
with the information available at each node. Following DE, a∗ = i. Following XE, a∗∗ =
E(z|s). The proof is reported in the Appendix.
The inequality provides some clear insights. Rewriting the expression as G(σ 2 ) = βθ(σ 2 )2 −
kθσ 2 − k ≥ 0, we see √
that this is a parabola opening
up, intersecting the y-axis at y = −k,
√
kθ− k2 θ2 +4βθk
kθ+ k2 θ2 +4βθk
< 0 and
> 0. Hence, XE is optimal when
and the x-axis at
2βθ
2βθ
√
2
2
kθ+ k θ +4βθk
G(σ 2 ) ≥ 0, and therefore when σ 2 ≥
> 0.
2βθ
Further, as expected, a larger cost of experimentation k implies a larger minimum σ 2 making
experimentation optimal. If experimentation is very costly, it is only valuable when the
return from learning – hence, a very uncertain market – is sufficiently high. Looking at
signal precision θ, except for exceptionally low values of σ 2 (i.e. σ 2 < kβ −1 ), the inequality
holds whenever θ ≥

1
σ 2 − βk

− σ12 . Hence, given market uncertainty, experimentation is optimal

if signal precision is high enough. In other words, if the learning capability of the venture
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is high, experimentation is valuable.
For additional clarity, I solve the inequality numerically. I evaluate payoffs for a matrix
of σ 2 − θ values and visualize the resulting decision rule for each pair. I will be using 100
equally-spaced values for σ 2 ∈ {1, 10} and θ ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.9}. Through the graphs, other
parameters’ values are set as follows30 : α = 10, β = 4, k = 4, i = 0.
I calculate the payoff difference D = π2 − π1 , reporting it in a three-dimensional graph in
Figure 7 and projecting it into two dimensions in Figure 8. The area where D is positive
is the set of σ 2 − θ pairs where experimentation is optimal. This graph shows that the
difference between π2 and π1 is higher when market uncertainty is high, and this relationship
is stronger when signal precision is also high.
Figure 7: Payoff Difference in 3D

This figure reports the 3D graph with σ 2 and θ, and payoff difference on the axis.

To better see the joint role of σ 2 and θ, I separately graph payoffs π1 and π2 across the
range of values of σ 2 in a two-dimensional graph reported in Figure 9. I repeat this exercise
for multiple values of θ (from low to high). The crossing point between the two functions
30

With the exception of extreme values, the results are largely robust to the choice of these parameters.
In particular, the patterns are robust to the value of initial idea i, which matters in the next version of the
model, where the adaptation cost Φ is present.
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Figure 8: Payoff Difference in 2D Projection

This figure reports the 2D projection of the 3D graph. The demarcation curve indicates pairs where Π1 = Π2 .

decreases as θ increases. Direct entry outperforms experimental entry when θ is very low.
Otherwise, for moderate to high values of θ, experimental entry is generally optimal.

3.4. Continuous Product Location and Adaptation
Experimentation requires incurring an upfront cost k, the cost of building the prototype
and running the experiment31 . Beyond that, it may be costly to implement the information
received, if that requires changing the location of the product from the initial idea i.
To examine this feature, I introduce costly adaptation into the model. The ex-post payoff
function is the following:


Π(a, z, S ) = W (a, z) − k(S ) − Φ(a, i) = α − β(a − z)2 − k(S ) − φ(a − i)2
The new element is the φ > 0, capturing the cost of adaptation32 . When φ is high, moving
31

Naturally, one could define this cost as endogenous too. However, making it constant does not affect
the logic this model wants to illustrate.
32
Campbell and Franco (2013) uses a similar framework in describing what they call “cost of fit”. In this
model, I use the square instead of the absolute value to simplify the algebra.
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Figure 9: Payoff for Different Values of θ

This figure reports the payoffs of each strategy for different values of θ. The level of σ 2 where the curves intersect
diminishes as θ increases.

from initial idea i to final product location a is particularly costly.

Therefore, if the venture chooses S1 , the payoff is Π(a, z) = W (a, z) − Φ(a, i) = α −

β(a − z)2 − φ(a − i)2 . If it chooses S2 , the payoff is Π(a, z) = W (a, z) − k − Φ(a, i) =


α − β(a − z)2 − k − φ(a − i)2 .
While algebraically more complicated, this reasoning follows closely that of the basic model.
One aspect worth emphasizing is that, due to the introduction of the adaptation costs, following XE, the optimal product location a∗∗ is no longer simply the conditional expectation
of z given s. It is instead a weighted average of E(z|S = s) and starting point i:
a∗∗ =

β
φ
E(z|S = s) +
i
β+φ
β+φ

Therefore, the larger φ relative to β, the harder it is to pivot away from initial idea i. I will
be defining Q =

β
β+φ

and T =

φi
β+φ ,

so that a∗∗ = Q E(z|s) + T . Repeating the procedure

discussed above, I obtain the following statement.
Proposition 3.3. Experimental entry XE is optimal when parameters σ 2 , k, θ, and φ
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satisfy the following condition:
!
α−k+

+

( σ12

1
+ θ)2

where Q =

− βT 2 − φT 2 − φi2 + 2φiT

2θi2
i2
2 2
2 2
+
θ
+
θ
i
+
θ
σ
+
σ4
σ2
β
β+φ

and T =

φi
β+φ ,

!
+ 2i βT − βT Q + φiQ − φT Q

!

!
− βQ2 − φQ2 + 2βQ − β

−

1
σ2

β
≥ α − βσ 2
+θ

and given parameters α and β.

The proof is reported in the Appendix. To examine the effect of φ on the decision rule, I
graph payoff difference D = π2 − π1 for multiple values of φ in Figure 10. The area where
D is positive is the set of values where experimentation is optimal. This graph shows that,
given a pair of σ 2 and θ, the value of experimentation generally decreases as φ increases.
When φ is high, experimentation is optimal only for very high values of market uncertainty.
For additional clarity, I project the graph into two dimensions in Figure 11. This graph
clarifies how the area where experimentation is optimal shrinks as cost of adaptation φ
increases.

3.5. Continuous Product Location, Adaptation, and Appropriability
Besides adaptation, a cost of experimentation is expropriation (Katila et al., 2008). If the
venture discloses its early-stage idea to get market feedback, competitors may perceive the
opportunity and decide to invest in the same market niche. Therefore, the value the venture
captures may diminish.
Introducing appropriability, the ex-post payoff function becomes the following:


Π(a, z, S ) = R(S ) W (a, z) − k(S ) − Φ(a, i) = R(S ) α − β(a − z)2 − k(S ) − φ(a − i)2
The addition relative to the previous model is R(S ), the fraction of value the venture is
able to capture. I assume R(S1 ) = 1 in case of DE and R(S2 ) = R ∈ [0, 1] in case of XE.

Therefore, upon choosing S1 , the payoff is Π1 (a, z) = W (a, z) − Φ(a, i) = α − β(a − z)2 −

φ(a−i)2 . Alternatively, when choosing S2 , the payoff is Π2 (a, z) = R W (a, z)−k−Φ(a, i) =


R α − β(a − z)2 − k − φ(a − i)2 .
Similar to the previous case, after XE, the optimal product location a∗∗ is no longer simply
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Figure 10: Payoff Difference for Different Values of φ in 3D

This figure reports the 3D graph for different values of φ. The demarcation curve indicates pairs where Π1 = Π2 . As
φ increases, the area under which experimentation is optimal shrinks.

E(z|S = s), but the weighted average of E(z|S = s) and starting point i:
a∗∗ =

As above, I will be defining Q =

Rβ
φ
E(z|S = s) +
i
Rβ + φ
Rβ + φ
Rβ
Rβ+φ

and T =

φi
Rβ+φ ,

so that a∗∗ = Q E(z|S = s) + T .

Repeating the usual procedure, I obtain the following statement.
Proposition 3.4. Experimental entry XE is optimal when parameters σ 2 , k, θ, φ, and R
satisfy the following condition:
!
Rα − k +

− RβT 2 − φT 2 − φi2 + 2φiT
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!
+ 2i RβT − RβT Q + φiQ − φT Q

Figure 11: Payoff Difference for Different Values of φ in 2D Projection

This figure reports the 2D projection of the 3D graph for different values of φ. The demarcation curve indicates pairs
where Π1 = Π2 . As φ increases, the area under which experimentation is optimal shrinks.

+

( σ12

1
+ θ)2

where Q =

2
i2
2 2
2 2 2θi
+θ+θ
i
+θ
σ
+
σ4
σ2
Rβ
Rβ+φ

and T =

φi
Rβ+φ ,

!

!
2

2

−RβQ −φQ +2RβQ−Rβ −

Rβ
≥ α−βσ 2
+θ

1
σ2

and given parameters α and β.

The proof is reported in the Appendix. To examine the effect of R on the decision rule, I
graph payoff difference D = π2 − π1 for multiple values of R in Figure 1233 . The area where
D is positive is the set of values where experimentation is optimal. This graph shows how
R has a positive effect on the value of experimentation, as expected.
As above, I project the graph into two dimensions in Figure 13. This graph clarifies how
the area where experimentation is optimal decreases as appropriability R decreases.
33

I assume φ = 1 for this graph.
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Figure 12: Payoff Difference for Different Values of R in 3D

This figure reports the 3D graph for different values of R. The demarcation curve indicates pairs where Π1 = Π2 . As
R decreases, the area under which experimentation is optimal shrinks.

Additionally, it is interesting to see how R affects the role of θ: as R increases, the effect
of θ becomes almost “linear”. When R is high, the θ needed to make experimentation
valuable decreases as σ 2 increases: when the venture appropriates all of the value created,
signal precision and amount of potential learning compensate for each other. Conversely,
when R is low, this effect does not occur: when the venture captures less value through
experimenting, the signal precision needed remains high even for high levels of potential
learning.

3.6. Discussion
This model proposes a formalization of the learning process taking place through experimentation. I discuss a series of limitations and potential ways to extend the model.
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Figure 13: Payoff Difference for Different Values of R in 2D Projection

This figure reports the 2D projection of the 3D graph for different values of R. The demarcation curve indicates pairs
where Π1 = Π2 . As R decreases, the area under which experimentation is optimal shrinks.

A fruitful direction would be to drop the assumption that direct entry and experimental
entry are two alternative routes. One could model the amount of resources invested into
experimentation e and the amount invested in internal development 1 − e. This approach
would allow me to make various parameters endogenous. For example, signal precision θ
could be a positive function of e. Further, this model could nicely accommodate another
component of willingness to pay, the technological quality of the product. Quality could be
a random variable with mean q̂, with q̂ being a positive function of 1 − e, consistent with
the idea of fit-quality tradeoff presented in chapter 2.
Modeling learning as a Bayesian process, this model assumes strong rationality. It would
be interesting to weaken this assumption by designing a different learning process. One
possibility would be to employ the notion of self-confirming equilibrium34 (Fudenberg and
34

Ryall (2003) discusses this notion in the context of corporate strategy. He defines a selfconfirming
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Levine, 1993; Ryall, 2003; Battigalli et al., 2015). Another direction would be to add the
notion of aspiration level (Greve, 1998). Hence, the model could feature a venture deciding
whether to proceed, pivot, or abandon the project depending on whether the feedback is
above or below its aspiration level. An entirely different way to model the learning process
would be to use the NK framework (Levinthal, 1997). In a setting with multiple periods,
this setting would allow us to observe the path the venture follows from the initial idea i
towards peak z.
This model assumes that adaptation takes place only by changing the product. Instead, one
could envision that adaptation may also take place through changing market segment. This
would require assuming the existence of (at least) two market segments – similar to Adner
and Zemsky (2005) – and a venture that can decide to switch from the starting market to
the alternative market if the feedback received suggests so. This would allow us to examine
the choice of adapting through the product versus adapting through the market.
Appropriability is formalized through a simple multiplicative factor R that determines the
amount of value the venture captures. This parameter could be viewed as the strength of
the intellectual property regime, similar to Gans et al. (2008). While this model is not
a biform game, this is also similar to Brandenburger and Stuart (2007). Either way, this
is naturally a very reduced-form assumption. In a more complex setting, the model could
include a potential entrant as an additional player, and a competitive game between venture
and entrant, following the venture’s experimentation. This would allow me to model the
vicarious learning of the potential entrant, who chooses to enter if it perceives that the
feedback generated by the experiment is positive35 ,
At this stage, reputation is not part of the picture. However, chapter 2 briefly discusses
how the signal has a potential reputational effect. To model that feature, the objective
function could be extended by adding a term that is a negative function of the distance
between s and i. A simple way to model this would be to add term −ω(s − i)2 to the
payoff function, where ω “measures information stickiness”. The intuition would be that
the larger the distance between the signal and the initial idea, the worse the initial idea is,
and thus the more negative the reputational effect.

equilibrium as the situation in which ”agents’ subjectively rational actions generate events that are consistent
with their own expectations.”
35
A stream of work in economic theory examine “free riding” of agents learning from other agents’ experimentation efforts in the framework of bandit models (Bolton and Harris, 1999; Keller et al., 2005).
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CHAPTER 4 : Experimentation and Structure: Evidence from Venture Pitches
4.1. Question
This chapter examines the relationship between organizational structure and experimentation36 . As discussed in Chapter 2, a primary driver of the value of experimentation is the
venture’s ability to effectively adapt to the information received during the experimentation
process. Organizational structure is a central contributor to such adaptation capability, and
thus provides an opportunity to study this channel empirically.
I investigate the coherence between strategy and structure in early-stage ventures, a topic
widely explored in large enterprises (Chandler, 1962). I classify strategy as experimentation
or planning (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2017). An experimentation-driven strategy relies on
minimum viable products, prototypes, and market feedback. A planning-driven strategy relies on market research, financial projections, and operational planning. I then measure the
degree of formal structure, in terms of hierarchy, role clarity, and administrative intensity.
I argue that experimentation requires fast and effective adaptation to the new information
received, and this is best achieved with a less formalized structure. On the other hand, planning requires the efficient execution of the formulated strategy, and this is best achieved
with a more formalized structure. Hence, experimentation should be combined with a less
formalized structure, while planning should be combined with high formal structure. If this
argument is valid and salient, ventures displaying coherent combinations of strategy and
structure should receive more positive evaluations by external stakeholders.
I test this argument using a proprietary dataset from a university-based venture competition. I collect and code ventures’ pitch decks to capture elements of strategy, structure,
and other relevant observable features, and match this data with the judges’ evaluations.
Because multiple judges evaluate multiple ventures, my core empirical strategy relies on the
use of judge-level fixed effects, removing potential influences associated with judge-specific
bias. Consistently with the argument outlined, I find robust evidence that the combination
of experimentation and formal structure generates negative evaluations, while the combination of planning and formal structure generates positive evaluations.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates the hypothesis. Section 3 illustrates
the empirical setting. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis.
36

This chapter is based on working paper ”Evaluation of Early-Stage Ventures: Coherent Combinations
of Experimentation, Planning, and Structure” co-authored with Trevor Young-Hyman. A preliminary draft
is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3179697. Sunkee Lee provided helpful
feedback. Sonali Dane, Tianhao Gao, Adam Nissinoff, Kyu Park, Jia Wei Teo, Rachel Walter, and Matthew
Weiss provided excellent research assistance.
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Section 6 concludes by discussing limitations and next steps.

4.2. Hypothesis
Burns and Stalker (1961) documented how organizational structures vary widely in terms
of formalization. More formalized organizations have a “mechanistic structure”: bureaucratic, with specific functional roles, and hierarchy. Less formalized organizations have an
“organic structure”: fewer bureaucratic roles, less functionally-specific role definition, and
less hierarchy. While common wisdom suggests that the degree of formal structure increases
with firm age and size, the literature shows that there is wide heterogeneity even at the
early stage (Pugh et al., 1969; Baron and Hannan, 2002).
The literature has offered different views on the effect of structure on venture performance
(McEvily et al., 2014). One view suggests early-stage firms are most effectively organized
with low formal structure, with little hierarchy, bureaucracy, and role clarity, as this increases the flexibility needed to change (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). Another view, however, suggests that formal structure increases decision-making speed, which is important in
the ambiguous environments where new ventures typically operate (Sine et al., 2006; Davis
et al., 2009).
I argue that the relationship between structure and performance is contingent to the strategy the venture uses. The processes of experimentation and planning require different
organizational structures. Experimentation requires a structure that can effectively and
quickly incorporate feedback by modifying the product or the business model. This is best
achieved with a low degree of formal structure. Planning requires a structure that allows
the efficient and rapid execution of the strategic direction chosen. This execution ability is
best implemented by a more formalized structure.
This complementarity between strategy and structure should improve the venture’s performance. Therefore, if external evaluators perceive this complementarity, they should reward
ventures communicating a coherent combination of strategy and structure. There are at
least three theoretical arguments suggesting that judges should respond to this complementarity.
First, these early-stage choices could be viewed as durable, because of path dependence
(Baron et al., 1999) or imprinting (Johnson, 2007). If that is the case, they should have
a positive effect on the venture’s future performance (Porter, 1996; Siggelkow, 2006). If
evaluators recognize this fact, they should positively evaluate ventures that display this
complementarity.
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Figure 14: Predicted Effects of Strategy and Structure

This figure describes the predicted evaluation of each combination of strategy and structure. The square on the second
row indicates the two interaction terms I will be testing in the empirical analysis.

A second explanation could be that, even if these choices are viewed as temporary, judges
could perceive the decision to present coherent combinations as a signal of higher human
capital (Connelly et al., 2011). Even if strategy and structure might change, the fact that
they were chosen coherently early on reveals a more capable founding team, which should
translate into better future performance.
A third explanation relies on a less rational decision process. Given the ambiguity of this
evaluation process (Huang and Pearce, 2015), evaluators may rely on “legitimate” signals
(Plummer et al., 2016) and view coherent choices as more appropriate. Hence, the evaluation
process could reward coherent ventures due to their higher legitimacy (Navis and Glynn,
2011).
While relying on different theoretical mechanisms, each of these arguments suggest the
positive interaction of experimentation and low formal structure and planning and high
formal structure. This discussion points to the following hypothesis, graphically illustrated
in Figure 14.
Hypothesis 4.1. Early-stage ventures that combine experimentation and low formal structure or planning and high formal structure receive more positive evaluations relative to those
displaying alternative combinations.

4.3. Empirical Setting
University-based venture competitions are contests where early-stage venture teams compete to obtain initial resources for their nascent business. While varying in submission and
evaluation procedures, these competitions share four common aspects: 1) teams are composed of mostly university students, 2) teams propose their idea through a pitch, 3) ideas
are evaluated by expert judges, often including alumni entrepreneurs and investors, and 4)
teams compete for financial and nonfinancial prizes.
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Venture competitions have increased exponentially during the past decade and are now a
cornerstone of the entrepreneurial ecosystems in most developed countries (Clingingsmith
and Shane, 2018). While there are no comprehensive data quantifying the magnitude of this
phenomenon, Howell (2017) reports that there were at least 87 competitions active in 17 US
states between 2007 and 2015. Virtually all universities with active business schools have
recently built or are currently building initiatives through which students can competitively
access resources to develop and launch their entrepreneurial ideas.
Besides its economic relevance, this setting is an appropriate “laboratory” to analyze the
process of early-stage venture evaluation. Participating teams are generally in their first
year of operation, and have no or extremely limited prior history. They often use these
contests as a way to get initial feedback from experts, as this is often one of their first
interactions with external stakeholders.
I collected primary data from the 2017 edition of a venture competition organized by the
business school of a large private US-based university37 . In this competition, at least one
team member must be a student of the university. The competition is composed of two
stages. In the first stage, teams submit an electronic application that includes an application
form, a pitch deck presenting the business idea, a video about the business idea, and an
optional personal video. Teams receiving the highest evaluations advance to the second
round, where they present live to an audience of judges. The winner receives a financial
prize, publicity, and access to a set of services.
This setting offers two important advantages for empirical analysis. First, as opposed to
settings where evaluators may draw information from a range of sources that may be difficult
for the researcher to observe, I am able to isolate the information available to judges, and
this reduces the otherwise large threat of omitted variables. I focus on the first stage of the
competition, where judges make their evaluations based on pitch deck and videos. Second,
the setting allows me to control for unobservable evaluator characteristics. Different sets of
ventures are evaluated by different sets of judges38 , and each judge conducts their evaluation
independently. By including fixed effects for judges, I am able to account for the range of
idiosyncratic biases that judges may unintentonally employ in their evaluations.

4.4. Data
Through a partnership with the competition organizers, I collected teams’ written and video
applications, judges’ evaluations, and judges’ information. The complete dataset contains
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The partner name will not be disclosed for confidentiality reasons.
The process through which judges are matched to pitches is partly voluntary and partly managed: in
each case, it is primarily driven by commonality of sector between judge and venture.
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110 applicant ventures and 223 judges evaluating them, with each venture being evaluated
by between 4 and 13 judges. In the main empirical specification – where I use the venturejudge unit of analysis in order to include judge fixed effects – I work with a sample of 686
distinct venture-judge observations.
The dependent variable is the score the pitch receives. The score data are provided by the
competition organizers39 . In the pitch-level analysis, I use the average score across all the
judges that evaluated a given pitch. In the pitch-judge-level analysis, I use the score that
judge gave to that pitch.
I use the text component of ventures’ submissions to capture the relevant aspects of each
pitch. The text material – composed of an application form and a pitch deck – is mandatory
for participation, and is thus available for all teams. I develop a detailed codebook to analyze
the text material, relying on the standard methodology of content analysis (Krippendorff,
2013). The key components of the codebook are reported in the Appendix. Once developed
final version of the codebook, I formed a team of three research assistants, unaware of the
purpose of the study, and asked each to code the application form and pitch deck of all 110
ventures. The three coders achieved a Krippendorf’s Alpha of 67.74%. Finally, I instructed
a fourth research assistant, also blind to the purpose of the study, to resolve the conflicts
between the three initial coders.
In terms of strategy, I measure the emphasis on experimentation or planning. Because a
company could be presenting itself as adopting both experimentation and planning, I coded
each as a distinct variable.
I measured experimentation as the circulation of an early-stage product, using the terminology of MVP, beta, testing, pilot, or prototype. I coded “focus on experimentation” and
“timing of experimentation”. For focus on experimentation, the coder was asked to measure
how much space the pitch devotes to experimentation: 0 if never mentioned, 1 if mentioned
at least once but without occupying one full slide, 2 if occupying one full slides, and 3 if
occupying at least two slides. For timing of experimentation, the coder was asked to measure when the experimentation is supposed to take place: 0 if it is not explicitly planned
to happen, 1 if it is planned to happen in the future, and 2 if it happened or is currently
ongoing. I combine these two dimensions into a unique measure of experimentation, ranging
from low priority to high priority, which I normalize to be bound between 0 and 1.
I measured planning in terms of three key elements of a business plan: market research,
financial planning, and operational planning. Market research was defined as discussion of
39

I rescaled the score variable from the original range to the [0 − 100] interval to protect the confidentiality
of the partner. This variable rescale has no meaningful impact on the econometric analysis.
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Table 1: Distribution of Strategy and Structure
Strategy
Low Experimentation Low Planning
Low Experimentation High Planning
High Experimentation Low Planning
High Experimentation High Planning

Full Sample
10
8
22
70

Low Structure
5
4
13
30

High Structure
5
4
9
40

This table illustrates the distribution of experimentation, planning, and structure across the 110 ventures in the
sample. The construction of variables Experimentation, Planning, and Structure is reported in Section 4.4. Part of
the Codebook used is reported in the Appendix.

competitors and customers, financial planning as explicit calculation or forecast of future
revenues of the company, and operational planning as description of how the project has
developed so far and how it will develop in the future. For each of these, the coder was
instructed to mark 0 if the element is not discussed, 1 if evidence of this element is provided
in non-detailed form, and 2 if the element is described extensively and in detail. The
planning variable again normalized between 0 and 1, is the average of these three variables.
To measure structure, I follow the work of Sine et al. (2006). I collected job titles each
team member was associated with, coded each on a four-point scale to capture the level of
authority (1 for low authority, 4 for high authority), and coded the corresponding functional
category (technology, marketing, design, human resources, finance, operations, and legal).
Based on these data, I build three measures: hierarchy, role clarity, and administrative
intensity. First, I calculated hierarchy as the standard deviation of authority levels among
workers holding job titles within the team (Greer, 2014). Second, I calculated role clarity as
the proportion of team members associated with a uniquely defined functional role. More
precisely, I calculate the proportion of team members with a role that is functionally-defined
(i.e. the deck explicitly reports their functional role) and unique (i.e. there are no other
team members with functional roles in that category). Third, I measure administrative
intensity as the proportion of team members with titles that specify managerial authority
(levels 3 and 4 on the four-point scale). I combine these three measures into one measure of
structure by taking their average. Each of the three variables and their aggregate measure
are bound between 0 and 1.
While I use the continuous versions of these variables in the core analysis, I build dummy
variables by dichotomizing around their median value and report their distribution in Table
1. As discussed above, experimentation and planning are not constrained to be antithetic
by the coding process, hence some ventures display high levels of both.
I include a large number of controls in the analysis. In particular, I attempt to account for
the venture characteristics that have been shown to generate legitimacy, including human
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean Score
Planning
Experimentation
Structure
Hierarchy
Clarity
Intensity
Size
Higher Degree
Female
Foreign
Pro Experience
Entr Experience
Ind Experience
Ext Funding
Ext Affiliations
Awards
Revenues
IP
Enterprise
Platform
Partnership
Data Focus
Old
Website
Supp Mat
Affective Passion
Cognitive Passion
Affective Passion D
Cognitive Passion D
Missing Video

Definition
Cross-judge average score calculated as sum
of 18 criteria (rescaled out of 100).
Average of market research, financial planning,
and operational planning.
Composition of focus and timing
of experimentation.
Average of hierarchy, clarity, and intensity.
Dispersion of authority levels.
Proportion of well-defined functional.
Proportion with managerial authority.
Number of people in team.
Proportion with Master’s or higher.
Proportion of foreigners within team.
Proportion of females within team.
Proportion with professional experience.
Proportion with entrepreneurial experience.
Proportion with experience within industry.
Dummy equal 1 if team received funding.
Number of affiliated external institutions.
Number of awards received.
Dummy equal 1 if the team has revenues.
Dummy equal 1 if team has intellectual property.
Dummy equaling 1 if product is B2B.
Dummy equaling 1 if product is platform.
Dummy equal 1 if partnerships are mentioned.
Dummy equal 1 if team if team has data focus.
Dummy equal 1 if team is older than one year.
Dummy equal 1 if team has an active website.
Dummy equal 1 if supplemental material is present.
Five-item measure of affective passion.
Six-item measure of cognitive passion.
Dummy equal 1 if aff passion is above median.
Dummy equal 1 if cog passion is above median.
Dummy equal 1 if missing video.

Mean
65.59

SD
10.32

Min
42.59

Max
87.27

N
110

0.70

0.23

0.17

1

110

0.49

0.35

0

1

110

0.24
0.14
0.33
0.26
2.65
0.70
0.32
0.28
0.72
0.17
0.4
0.09
1.15
1.55
0.05
0.1
0.27
0.32
0.67
0.33
0.04
0.55
0.56
2.92
3.95
0.35
0.36
0.31

0.26
0.22
0.37
0.4
1.27
0.44
0.4
0.38
0.4
0.3
0.42
0.29
2.35
2.96
0.21
0.3
0.45
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.19
0.5
0.5
0.72
0.34
0.48
0.48
0.46

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.2
3.06
0
0
0

0.68
1
1
1
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
16
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4.27
4.67
1
1
1

110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
76
76
110
110
110

This table contains the summary statistics at the pitch unit of analysis. Controls measuring human capital include
size, higher degree, female, foreign, professional experience, entrepreneurial experience, and industry experience. Controls measuring reputation include external funding, external affiliations, awards, and revenues. Controls measuring
technology include IP, enterprise, platform, partnership, and data focus. Controls measuring effort include old, website, and supplemental material. Controls measuring tone include affective passion, cognitive passion, affective passion
dummy, cognitive passion dummy, and missing video. Unless otherwise noted, throughout the analysis I will be using
controls for human capital, reputation, technology, and effort. The dataset contains 110 ventures.

capital, reputation, and technology. I also measure the effort the team has put into the
application, which is likely to play an important role in the evaluation. Table 2 defines and
describes all variables used.
While the core data is based on the text material, I code the video material and use it for
robustness purposes. To extract quantitative information for regression analysis from the
video material, I use the approach of Chen et al. (2009) who propose an eleven-item survey
scale to measure “affective passion” (enthusiasm) and “cognitive passion” (preparedness).
I form a team of three research assistants, blind to the purpose of the study, to rate each
video, and take the inter-coder average value for each of the eleven items. I then aggregate
them to calculate affective and cognitive passion.
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4.5. Analysis
I test the hypothesis by examining the effect of strategy, structure, and their interactions
on the score the pitch receives in the competition. Furthermore, I run the analysis using an
“alignment” variable instead of the interaction terms. Finally, I analyze how this pattern
varies depending on the experience of the evaluators.
4.5.1. Main Analysis
I examine the effects of strategy, structure, and the other factors listed in Table 2 on the
evaluation. Given the hypothesis, the focus is on the interaction terms between experimentation and structure and planning and structure.
In the simplest specification, I analyze the data at the venture level by running crosssectional OLS regressions of the following form:
Ŝi = α + β1 Expi + β2 P lani + β3 Stri + β4 Expi Stri + β5 P lani Stri + Γ Xi + i (4.1)
where i is the venture, Ŝi is the across-judge mean score, Expi is experimentation, P lani
is planning, Stri is one of the four measures of structure, and Xi is a vector of control
variables.
Table 3 contains regressions of experimentation, planning, structure, and their interactions
on average score40 . I do not find strong main effects of strategy and structure, especially
when I include controls. However, I find large and significant effects of the interaction terms,
consistently with the argument. In column 3, where I use the aggregate structure measure,
the interaction effect between planning and structure is positive, large, and statistically
significant. Furthermore, the interaction between experimentation and structure is negative,
large, and statistically significant. When I disaggregate my structure measure into the three
components - hierarchy, clarity, and intensity - the results are generally consistent, and
especially strong in the case of intensity.
I then employ a more stringent specification, moving to the venture-judge level of analysis.
This approach – similar to Hsu (2004) – allows me to remove judge-specific bias. In what I
40

In unreported analysis, I examine the correlation between the control variables and average score, estimating equation 4.1 without the key independent variables. This analysis confirms a series of expected
findings. Size is positively correlated to evaluation, because larger teams may be associated with more
enthusiasm and more effort around a new product idea, and have access to larger pools of resources and
capabilities. Signals of positive reputation – in the forms of external affiliations and awards received – are
positively correlated to evaluation. Teams showing more effort – by submitting optional supplementary
material – receive higher evaluations. I also find some unexpected results. In particular, I find little effect
of education and past experience, against the common wisdom that human capital plays the most critical
role in the evaluation of early-stage ventures.
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Table 3: Strategy, Structure, and Mean Score
Experimentation
Planning
Structure

(1)
Score
0.943
(2.663)
15.215∗∗∗
(4.057)
9.468∗∗∗
(3.573)

(2)
Score
0.318
(2.717)
11.412∗∗
(4.494)
7.274∗
(4.060)

(3)
Score
7.219∗
(4.192)
4.442
(6.008)
-2.695
(12.360)

Hierarchy

(4)
Score
1.535
(3.535)
7.824
(5.393)

(5)
Score
5.963
(3.672)
7.833
(5.491)

-11.350
(10.068)

Clarity

10.123
(12.291)

Intensity

-13.256
(9.292)
-26.207∗∗
(11.035)
34.753∗∗
(14.874)

Experimentation x Structure
Planning x Structure
Experimentation x Hierarchy

-4.765
(10.426)
26.966∗∗
(11.687)

Planning x Hierarchy

-14.025∗
(7.297)
5.281
(13.570)

Experimentation x Clarity
Planning x Clarity
Experimentation x Intensity
Planning x Intensity
Controls
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(6)
Score
4.368
(3.164)
5.978
(5.694)

110
0.18
10.378
OLS

x
110
0.28
4.998
OLS

x
110
0.33
7.491
OLS

x
110
0.26
5.935
OLS

x
110
0.31
6.057
OLS

-18.576∗∗∗
(6.303)
36.667∗∗∗
(11.823)
x
110
0.33
7.230
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of strategy and structure on mean score. The estimation uses equation 4.1.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Stars denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is average score. Controls are listed in
Table 2.

consider my core specification, I run OLS panel regressions of the following form:
Si,j = α+β1 Expi +β2 P lani +β3 Stri +β4 Expi Stri +β5 P lani Stri +Γ Xi +Jj +i (4.2)
where i is the venture, j is the judge, Si,j is the score judge j assigns to venture i, Expi
is experimentation, P lani is planning, Stri is one of the four measures of structure, Jj are
judge fixed effects, and Xi is a vector of control variables. Because the evaluations of each
judge are likely correlated, I use standard errors clustered at the judge level.
The results, reported in Table 4, are largely consistent with the initial analysis. In column
2, with the inclusion of controls, the main effects of experimentation and structure are not
significant. I do, however, find a significant positive main effect of planning. While not
contemplated by my theoretical argument, it is possible that a careful planning process,
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demonstrated by detailed market research or extensive financial planning, may signal other
factors, such as effort or competence, and thus may by itself have a positive effect. In
column 3, the interaction effect between planning and structure is positive, large, and statistically significant. Furthermore, the interaction between experimentation and structure
is negative, large, and statistically significant. These results provide evidence in support of
my hypothesis.
Table 4: Strategy, Structure, and Score
Experimentation
Planning
Structure

(1)
Score
0.446
(1.810)
19.142∗∗∗
(2.779)
7.839∗∗∗
(2.299)

(2)
Score
-0.306
(2.046)
15.815∗∗∗
(3.081)
2.908
(3.340)

(3)
Score
4.777
(3.088)
10.453∗∗
(4.259)
-6.872
(9.942)

Hierarchy

(4)
Score
1.748
(2.462)
13.085∗∗∗
(3.499)

(5)
Score
2.570
(2.925)
13.440∗∗∗
(4.139)

-7.792
(9.760)

Clarity

3.739
(7.783)
-11.796∗
(6.234)

Intensity
-20.814∗∗∗
(7.966)
30.427∗∗
(12.774)

Experimentation x Structure
Planning x Structure
Experimentation x Hierarchy

-11.810
(8.919)
24.401∗∗
(11.483)

Planning x Hierarchy
Experimentation x Clarity

-8.421
(5.547)
5.662
(8.624)

Planning x Clarity
Experimentation x Intensity
Planning x Intensity
Judge FE
Controls
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(6)
Score
2.967
(2.676)
11.130∗∗∗
(3.852)

x
686
0.13
23.979
OLS

x
x
686
0.22
8.585
OLS

x
x
686
0.23
8.820
OLS

x
x
686
0.22
8.807
OLS

x
x
686
0.22
8.824
OLS

-13.674∗∗∗
(5.093)
27.930∗∗∗
(9.213)
x
x
686
0.23
8.904
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of strategy and structure on score. The estimation uses equation 4.2. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is score. Controls are listed in Table 2.

Figure 15 reports graphically the coefficients from the regression of Column 3, highlighting the opposite sign of the interaction terms of structure with experimentation and with
planning. The graph clearly shows that, when structure is low, the strategy chosen matters
little. When structure is high, however, experimentation and planning have a radically
different effect.
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Figure 15: Interaction Effects between Strategy and Structure

This figure reports the predicted scores of strategy and structure based on the regression in Table 4 Column 3. The top
graph illustrates the interaction between experimentation and structure. The bottom graph illustrates the interaction
between planning and structure. This figure is obtained using STATA command marginsplot.

4.5.2. Robustness Checks
My analysis is vulnerable to endogeneity due to potential omitted variables about the venture. While I have no “experimental setting” to alleviate this issue, I perform a series of
robustness checks to further validate my findings. I report them in Table 5.
First, I introduce a set of 10 macro-sector dummy variables, trying to control for the acrosssector heterogeneity. The macro-sectors include consumer, education, government, health,
industry, media, services, social, technology, and transportation. Second, I run the analysis
in the sample without the ventures older than one year or with positive revenues (column
2), which may be influential outliers. In both cases, the main results are robust.
Finally, I introduce the video-related variables to control for the tone of the pitch (columns
3 and 4). I first add the continuous measures of affective and cognitive passion (column
3), removing observations with missing data. The results are weaker: the experimentationstructure interaction is essentially zero, while the planning-structure interaction is large in
magnitude but not statistically significant. I believe this is primarily due to the severe
restriction in sample size due to missing values in the video-related variables, as videos
were optional. In column 4 I take a different approach, adding dummies for above-median
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affective passion and above-median cognitive passion, both assumed to be zero for missing
values. To control for the missing values, I then add a missing-video dummy. Being now
able to use the full sample, I find the pattern obtained in the rest of the analysis.
Table 5: Strategy, Structure, and Score - Robustness Checks

Experimentation
Plan
Structure
Experimentation x Structure
Plan x Structure

(1)
Score
4.897
(3.531)
11.179∗∗∗
(4.201)
-1.194
(10.688)
-23.778∗∗∗
(8.575)
28.031∗∗
(12.924)

(2)
Score
5.117
(3.138)
9.222∗∗
(4.441)
-6.385
(10.446)
-20.857∗∗
(8.121)
30.830∗∗
(13.305)

Aff Passion
Cog Passion

(3)
Score
-2.950
(5.138)
14.405∗∗∗
(5.360)
-3.149
(14.377)
0.082
(13.713)
21.136
(19.990)
0.765
(1.332)
4.666
(2.986)

Cog Passion Dummy
Aff Passion Dummy
Missing Video
Judge FE
Controls
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

x
x
686
0.24
7.862
OLS

x
x
648
0.22
8.209
OLS

x
x
452
0.27
6.666
OLS

(4)
Score
5.571∗
(3.342)
9.796∗∗
(4.529)
-5.646
(10.861)
-20.438∗∗
(8.736)
29.441∗∗
(13.070)

2.592
(1.688)
1.336
(1.825)
0.770
(1.952)
x
x
648
0.22
7.639
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of strategy and structure on score. The estimation uses equation 4.2. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is score. Controls are listed in Table 2.

4.5.3. Alignment
The argument suggests that the coherence between strategy and structure is positively
correlated to evaluators’ perception of the venture. The analysis so far has translated
coherence into interaction terms. I now take a different approach and run the analysis
creating an “alignment” variable. The results are reported in Table 6.
Exploiting the dummies used in Table 1, I build dummies for aligned experimentation
strategy (equal 1 if experimentation is 1 and structure is 0, and equal 0 otherwise) and
aligned planning strategy (equal 1 if planning is 1 and structure is 1, equal 0 otherwise).
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Column 1 reports this analysis, finding that aligned planning has a positive effect on score,
while I find no effect of aligned experimentation.
In column 2, I combine the two alignment dummies into a general alignment dummy, which
takes value 1 when either experimentation or planning are aligned, and 0 otherwise. Column
2 reports a positive, significant effect of alignment on score. Using the general alignment
variable, I am able to employ the coarsened exact matching approach (Blackwell et al., 2009;
Iacus et al., 2012), which allows me to alleviate the impact of selection on observables. In
column 3, I remove the unmatched observations and run my specification on the matched
sample, finding once again a positive significant effect of alignment on score.
Table 6: Alignment and Score

Aligned Experimentation Dummy
Aligned Planning Dummy

(1)
Score
2.968
(1.855)
7.002∗∗∗
(1.845)

Aligned Dummy
Judge FE
Controls
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

x
x
686
0.18
7.829
OLS

(2)
Score

(3)
Score

4.209∗∗∗
(1.530)
x
x
686
0.17
7.177
OLS

3.286∗
(1.946)
x
x
465
0.21
12.526
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of alignment on score. The estimation uses equation 4.2. Each column
reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. Stars denote
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is score. Controls are listed in Table 2. Column 1 uses
two separate alignment variables. Columns 2 and 3 use one alignment variable. Column 3 uses a matched sample
built using the coarsened exact matching approach (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2012).

4.5.4. Judge Experience
The analysis reveals that ventures using coherent combinations of experimentation, planning, and structure receive more positive evaluations. However, the mechanism driving this
result is still not clear.
To shed some light on the driver of this effect, I focus on evaluators who are expected to have
more knowledge of the entrepreneurial process. To capture this information, I extracted the
work histories of the judges from their LinkedIn profiles. For each judge, I code each work
experience listed on LinkedIn as a founder experience or as an investor experience. With this
information, I classify the judges as 1) having or not having founder experience, 2) having
or not having investor experience, and 3) having or not having entrepreneurship-related
experience.
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Table 8 runs the analysis dividing the sample into judges without experience and those
with experience. The pattern is essentially the same as in the main analysis. However, in
the subsample of judges with investor experience, the effect is larger and more statistically
significant, despite the substantially smaller sample.
These results suggest that the interaction between strategy and structure play a larger role
when the evaluators have relevant experience in the field. While not providing a sharp
test for my mechanism, this analysis provides at least suggestive evidence that a better
understanding of entrepreneurship implies a stronger sensitivity to the complementarity
between strategy and structure. This is more consistent with rationality-based explanations,
such as fit and human capital.
The human capital explanation suggests that judges may perceive that a team’s decision
to present coherent combinations reflects simply a more capable team. While plausible, I
control for human capital in several ways. Despite these controls, the effect of the interaction
terms is still strong. Therefore, it seems unlikely that this could be the dominant mechanism.
Thus, ultimately, the evidence points to the validity of the fit explanation.
Table 7: Strategy, Structure, Score, and Judge Experience

Exp
Plan
Stru
Exp x Stru
Plan x Stru
Judge FE
Controls
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(1)
Score
Low Founder
Experience
5.076
(4.954)
13.407∗
(7.880)
-18.895
(17.551)
-17.161
(13.312)
34.188
(21.805)
x
x
297
0.26
11.494
OLS

(2)
Score
High Founder
Experience
-0.179
(5.147)
10.246∗∗
(4.645)
2.462
(12.889)
-14.217
(12.736)
22.739
(15.842)
x
x
326
0.23
7.687
OLS

(3)
Score
Low Investor
Experience
3.643
(3.621)
14.646∗∗∗
(4.801)
-2.680
(11.451)
-16.522∗
(9.507)
21.434
(15.264)
x
x
506
0.25
9.075
OLS

(4)
Score
High Investor
Experience
10.837
(7.833)
4.480
(9.623)
-0.925
(19.094)
-69.360∗∗∗
(18.125)
56.522∗
(27.974)
x
x
117
0.39
NA
OLS

(5)
Score
Low Total
Experience
6.218
(6.248)
14.739
(8.954)
10.677
(19.668)
-22.547
(14.054)
15.969
(26.318)
x
x
259
0.23
15.284
OLS

(6)
Score
High Total
Experience
-0.833
(4.004)
11.097∗∗
(4.760)
-13.317
(10.078)
-12.894
(10.122)
30.332∗∗
(13.740)
x
x
364
0.26
7.533
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of strategy and structure on score. The estimation uses equation 4.2. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is score. Controls are listed in Table 2.

4.6. Discussion
This chapter examined the role of formal structure in evaluators’ perception of ventures’
strategic choices. When ventures choose coherent combinations of strategy and structure
– experimentation and low formalization or planning and high formalization – they receive

47

more positive evaluations. The analysis also suggests that at least part of the effect may
be driven by a rational examination of the fit between strategy and structure, as the effects
are driven by judges supposed to have more knowledge of entrepreneurship. I conclude by
discussing the limitations of this study and potential ways to address them.
First, the analysis is subject to potential omitted variable bias, threatening the internal
validity of the findings. However, it is unlikely that such causal evidence will come from
other observational studies, where the potential for omitted variable bias remains. Future
research should seek to replicate these results in an experimental setting. Specifically,
one could design a randomized experiment in which evaluators are asked to evaluate a
series of pitches, holding all other elements constant while randomly manipulating strategy
and structure. One potential approach in this direction is to use the experimental design
of Boudreau et al. (2016). In this setting, the authors create random pairs of evaluator
and evaluaee, and then measure the causal impact of their “intellectual distance” on the
evaluation. In my setting, the variable of interest could be the emphasis on a given strategy
or structure relative to other ventures evaluated by the same judge, and their interaction
terms. Given that these variables are measured in a relative way, this analysis would allow
me to include venture and judge fixed effects.
Furthermore, while providing some suggestive evidence, this study is unable to provide a
sharp test of the mechanism driving the results. It would be helpful to find clearer evidence
on what drives the positive effect of the complementarity. One way to shed more light on
the mechanism is to collect data about the actual performance of the ventures after the
competition, measuring whether they survived, changed, and grew. If the interaction terms
between strategy and structure have the predicted effects also on this family of dependent
variables, the evidence would be supportive of the rationality-based explanations. If the
interaction terms have no effects, the evidence would be more consistent with the legitimacybased explanation. Besides helping to disentangle the mechanism this analysis would have
relevant implications for venture competition designers as well.
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CHAPTER 5 : Experimentation and Appropriability: Evidence from Software
5.1. Question
This chapter examines the relationship between appropriability and experimentation41 . As
discussed in Chapter 2, appropriability is a primary channel driving the value of experimentation. To test this idea, I study how the strength of the appropriability regime affects
the choice of experimentation relative to direct entry.
I argue that experimentation requires disclosing at least part of the idea to the market,
creating imitation risk and diminishing the venture’s appropriability. The degree of appropriability is driven by two forms of IP: formal IP – including patents, copyrights, trademarks,
and secrecy – and informal IP – including complexity, capital investment, lead time, and
networks. If the venture can effectively protect its innovation through some form of IP,
experimentation is a viable strategy; otherwise, it is risky. Because IIP is generally developed in the long run, FIP is the primary tool available to early-stage ventures. If ventures
perceive this tradeoff, they should do less experimentation if they are not able to effectively
employ FIP to protect their idea. Based on this discussion, I hypothesize that, when FIP
is weak, ventures are less likely to engage in experimentation.
I test this argument in the US software industry. I assemble a hand-collected dataset of
over 1,200 US-based software ventures founded in 2012-2016. To causally estimate the
impact of FIP on experimentation, I exploit a 2014 US Supreme Court ruling – Alice Corp
v CLS Bank International – that has decreased the effectiveness of patent protection for
financial software relative to non-financial software. I analyze the data using a differencein-differences approach, employing both linear regression and survival analysis. Consistent
with the hypothesis, I find that affected ventures are less likely to experiment. This negative
effect is driven by ventures with low learning incentive.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates the hypothesis. Section 3 illustrates
the empirical setting. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis.
Section 6 concludes by discussing limitations and next steps.
41
This chapter is based on working paper ”Experimentation and Appropriability in Early-Stage
Ventures:
Evidence from the US Software Industry”.
A preliminary draft is available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3282261. Pooria Assadi, Iwan Barankay, Aymeric
Bellon, Matthew Bidwell, Jaeho Choi, Fabrizio Dell’Acqua, Emilie Feldman, Simone Ferriani, Alfonso Gambardella, Todd Gormley, Marco Grotteria, Andy Hafenbrack, David Hall, Zeke Hernandez, David Hsu,
Evgeny Kagan, Rahul Kapoor, Nicola Lacetera, Dan Levinthal, Tong Liu, Alex Miller, Serguei Netessine,
Andrea Passalacqua, Lamar Pierce, Michele Pinelli, Luca Pistilli, Luis Rios, Mike Roach, Paul Shaman, Nicolaj Siggelkow, Scott Stern, Sruthi Thatchenkery, Marco Testoni, Trevor Young-Hyman, and Hongyu Xiao
provided helpful feedback. Stephanie Li, Adam Nissinoff, Rachel Prokupek, Rachel Walter, and Catherine
Wang provided excellent research assistance.
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5.2. Hypothesis
By circulating early-stage versions of the product to the market, ventures can learn about
the preferences of its potential customer group and adapt the product development process
accordingly. At the same time, when ventures experiment, they are essentially giving the
market access to information about their idea incurring the risk of imitation (Lieberman
and Asaba, 2006).
Ventures can alleviate the threat of imitation through IP protection. IP mechanisms42 can
be formal or informal (Hall et al., 2014). FIP includes legal tools such as patents, copyrights,
trademarks (Ramello and Silva, 2006), and secrecy (Png, 2017a,b; Contigiani et al., 2018).
IIP includes strategic tools such as complexity (Szulanski, 1996; Rivkin, 2000), lead time,
capital requirements, and partners’ network positions (Hallen et al., 2014).
Ventures strategically choose their appropriability regime (Gans and Stern, 2017; Ching
et al., 2018). After launch43 , a venture is more likely to have access to IIP. The investments
that take place at launch – such as public relations, advertising, and media presence –
may lead to the creation of a series of complementary assets (Teece, 1986), such as brand,
economies of scale, and network effects. Furthermore, once the product development process
is advanced enough, the venture may also have a substantial technological advantage. These
complementary assets typically arising post-launch help create barriers to imitation. However, these assets are generally not available prior to launch. Therefore, prior to launching
the product, the primary form of protection is likely to be FIP44 .
Absent some form of FIP, experimentation may lead to imitation and thus reduce value capture. This creates a tension between learning and appropriability during the time between
the start of experimentation and launch, as illustrated in Figure 16. If the venture is able
to protect the idea through FIP, it can experiment safely, collecting market feedback while
alleviating the threat of imitation. If FIP is weak, the venture is vulnerable to imitation,
and experimentation may be risky. This argument leads to the following hypothesis.
42

The literature has documented that large firms make substantially different choices in terms of their IP
portfolio, combining different elements of FIP and IIP (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Graham et al.,
2009; Alcacer et al., 2017).
43
Experimentation and launch are distinct moments of the life cycle of a nascent venture. Conceptually,
the fundamental difference between experimentation and launch is the motivation driving each action. Experimentation is an effort devoted to learning. While learning also occurs after launch, launching a product
aims at revenues and ultimately profits. Therefore, the incentives driving experimentation and launch are
substantially different. Observationally, the critical difference is in the nature of the activity. Launch involves
a series of marketing investments which typically do not take place with experimentation.
44
Naturally, also prior to launch ventures differ in terms of their imitability. For example, ventures building
more complex products (Szulanski, 1996; Rivkin, 2000) are less likely to be easily imitated. However, in
general, IIP is arguably lower prior to launch than after.
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Hypothesis 5.1. When formal intellectual property is weak, ventures are less likely to
engage in experimentation.
Figure 16: Learning-Appropriability Tension

This figure illustrates the learning-appropriability tension that arises during the experimentation phase. The vertical
lines denote the key moments in the life cycle of a nascent venture: ideation, start of experimentation, and launch.
While the venture naturally receives market feedback and changes after launch, it may choose to obtain market
feedback before then through experimentation. Absent some form of FIP, experimentation creates a tension between
learning and appropriability: the venture learns from market feedback while incurring the risk of imitation.

5.3. Empirical Setting
I test this hypothesis in the context of the US software industry. Software is a fundamental
sector of the economy (Arora et al., 2013; Branstetter et al., 2019), driving innovation
and growth in many developed countries45 . Furthermore, due to the low upfront cost of
experimentation typical of this industry (Ewens et al., 2018), ventures have the leeway
to make decisions about experimentation based on strategic considerations rather than
purely financial or regulatory constraints – this feature makes this setting an appropriate
“laboratory” for this study. Finally, this setting has two aspects that facilitate the empirical
analysis. First, an institutional aspect of this industry – the terminology used to describe
the stages of the product development process – may be leveraged for the measurement of
experimentation. Second, a recent development in the IP regulation of this industry offers
an opportunity for causal identification. I discuss each in detail.
5.3.1. Software Release Life Cycle
The software industry features a well-defined and largely shared terminology describing the
stages of the product development process, generally known as the SRLC. In particular, the
45

Marc Andreessen famously stated “My own theory is that we are in the middle of a dramatic and broad technological and economic shift in which software companies are poised to take
over large swathes of the economy.”
Please see the original 2011 Wall Street Journal article at
https:www.wsj.comarticlesSB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460.
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practice of circulating an incomplete product is almost universally known as “beta testing”.
MacCormack et al. (2001) write:
We define a beta version as a version of the product that contains at least part of
all the core component modules (even though these modules may be functionally
incomplete), and hence can function as a system.
Additional keywords commonly used to define incomplete products circulated for testing
purposes include “alpha”, “pilot”, “trial”, and “prototype”. While these notions marginally
differ, they all indicate an effort to disclose an incomplete product to the market with the
objective of collecting feedback. The Appendix provides additional details about the SRLC.
This institutional aspect is critical for the measurement of experimentation. In most settings, it is challenging to distinguish product testing from product launch. In software,
the SRLC terminology provides one way to overcome this problem. So, I will be treating
evidence that a venture has made a testing effort as an instance of experimentation.
Naturally, one concern with using this measurement approach is that companies might use
the SRLC terminology strategically. However, I believe the incentive structure of early-stage
ventures makes this scenario unlikely, as I discuss in detail in the Appendix. Furthermore,
my qualitative analysis found no clear evidence of a systematic bias in this respect. Most
survey responses suggested that testing is largely viewed as a way to obtain feedback, and
thus it is a form of experimentation. Therefore, while I cannot perfectly rule out this
possibility, I believe its weight on the overall analysis is limited.
Finally, it is important to note that the circulation of a beta product is generally considered
what US law views as the “public disclosure” of an invention, and so starts the one-year
grace period the inventor has prior to filing a patent application. This institutional element
makes IP a central factor in how ventures strategize around testing46 . If a venture is willing
to test its product, it needs to file a patent application before doing so or shortly thereafter,
otherwise it loses the right to patent47 .
46

In fact, as the one-year grace period is an institutional aspect of the US legal system but not one of
other major countries, the public disclosure of an invention immediately prevents the inventor from filing
a patent in most other major economies. Therefore, US-based venture teams with plans for international
expansion are likely to be even more sensitive to this fact.
47
Technically, the US system includes the so-called “inventor experimental use” exception (Barash, 1997).
Not to be confused with the so-called “third party experimental use” exception, the “inventor experimental
use” doctrine removes the one-year deadline if the invention is used for experimental purposes. However,
this doctrine is rarely and narrowly applied.
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5.3.2. Alice Corp v CLS Bank International
Patent protection plays a multifaceted role in the context of early-stage ventures. Survey
evidence by Graham and Sichelman (2008) and Graham et al. (2009) suggests that ventures
use patents to prevent copying, secure financing, and enhance reputation. While not the
only purpose (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013), the rationale for using patents to reduce the risk of
imitation48 is relevant for ventures, despite the cost of patent filing49 .
The situation is more complex in the software industry (Bessen and Hunt, 2007; Allison
and Mann, 2007; Lemley, 2012; Hall and MacGarvie, 2010). However, Graham et al. (2009)
document that the use of patents in software ventures, while generally less pronounced than
for ventures in other high-technology sectors, is still relevant50 .
Much of the uncertainty around patenting in software is due to history. Patenting software
in the US system became established with the 1998 ruling State Street Bank & Trust Co. v
Signature Financial Group, Inc by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This
decision started the trend of patenting in business methods and software (Lerner, 2002).
The trend decelerated with US Supreme Court rulings Bilski v Kappos in 2010 and Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc in 2012. These decisions created
some degree of uncertainty in the patenting landscape, but did not radically change the
environment. The occurrence of Alice in 2014 is widely considered the event that reshaped
the IP regime in the US software industry.
Alice Corp51 owned four patents52 protecting an electronic escrow service, a system to
48

Firms that file patent applications obtain the status of “patent pending”. This is especially relevant
since the introduction of AIPA in 1999 (Graham and Hegde, 2015), which made patent applications visible
after 18 months from the time of filing.
49
Financially constrained ventures often qualify for lower application fees and may choose to file
provisional applications. Please see https:www.uspto.gov/patentsgettingstarted/patentbasics/typespatentapplications/provisionalapplicationpatent. Provisional applications have become particularly common when
the US moved to the “first-to-file” system with the American Invents Act, conforming to the other major
economies around the world. The act was signed in September 2011 and launched into force in March 2013.
Notice that this institutional change affected all firms in the US and thus does not confound the empirical
analysis presented here.
50
Graham et al. (2009) documents that 24% of software ventures hold patents or have applied for patents
and that the average number of patents or patent applications per venture is 1.7 (Figure 1, page 1277). Further, software ventures seek patent protection primarily for two reasons: preventing imitation and enhancing
reputation (Figure 3, page 1301). Finally, if they choose not to seek patent protection, software ventures do
so primarily due to the cost of filing and the cost of enforcing (Table 2, page 1313).
51
Part of the motivation behind Alice was to highlight the increasingly powerful role of “patent trolls”.
Alice Corp itself was defined as a patent troll by some observers. A patent troll – or, more formally, a nonpracticing entity – is an organization that seeks to profit from enforcing patents rather than from commercial
activities based on the patents (Pohlmann and Opitz, 2013).
52
The patents involved are US5970479, US6912510, US7149720, and US7725375. The oldest and possibly
most critical patent is probably US5970479 ”Methods and apparatus relating to the formulation and trading
of risk management contracts”.

53

reduce settlement risk in financial transactions. Alice argued that CLS Bank was infringing
on these patents by using a similar technology. In response, CLS Bank sued Alice Corp in
the US District Court for the District of Columbia in May 2007, seeking a declaration that
such accusations were invalid. After the District Court declared the patents invalid, Alice
Corp appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court
of Appeals initially reversed the District Court’s opinion, then reheard the case “en banc”,
and finally agreed with the District Court in May 2013, albeit in a very divided opinion53 .
At this point, Alice petitioned for “certiorari”, thus essentially asking the Supreme Court
to intervene on the case. Given the importance of the case, and the public opinion’s interest
in it, the US Supreme Court agreed to examine the case in December 2013. The Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on March 31, 2014 and issued its opinion on June 19, 201454 .
The Supreme Court invalidated the patents due to the lack of patentable subject matter
under Title 35 of the United States Code Section 10155 . The key statement in the text
reads as follows:
We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediate
settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
This ruling has essentially institutionalized what is now known as the “Mayo-Alice rule” for
evaluating computer-implemented patents: first, determine whether the claims are directed
to a patent-ineligible concept; if so, examine whether the elements of the claims collectively
transform the idea into a patent-eligible concept Tran (2016).
While the text is relatively generic and may be thought of as affecting all software patents,
Alice is widely considered to have substantially diminished the effectiveness of patenting in
a subset of the industry: financial software. In fact, this is consistent with process leading
to the ruling. Sunstein (2014) documents that:
Justice Thomas did not write the only opinion in Alice; Justice Sotomayor wrote
a concurring opinion, in which she was joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer,
stating that she adhered to the view that ”any ’claim that merely describes a
53
Tran (2015) reports that Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader asserted ”Nothing said today beyond our
judgement has the weight of precedent.”
54
A detailed description of the Alice case is provided by Patent Progress, a project managed by the
Computer & Communications Industry Association. Please see https://www.patentprogress.org/cases/clsv-alice-corp-d-d-c/.
55
The
original
text
of
the
Supreme
Court
decision
is
available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/13.
The opinion was led by Justice Clarence
Thomas. The decision was made unanimously.
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method of doing business does not qualify as a ”process” under Section 101.”
Accordingly, much of the legal literature confirms that the primary impact of Alice was on
financial software. For example, Stern (2014) writes:
The Flook-Mayo-Alice rule would not seem to threaten the patent eligibility of
those software patents that are not mere routine computerizations of preexisting business or financial expedients. By implication at least, the Alice opinion
leaves room for patents on software that improves technological and industrial
processes. Software on the internal functioning of computers would also appear
patentable. Although the opinion did not say so, probably patents on software
for encryption or data compression, if not deemed simply mathematics, would
be left patent eligible.
Similarly, Tran (2015) writes:
As an “unwritten policy,” patent examiners currently view all claims reciting
financial or business methods as presumably directed to abstract ideas: categorizing any subject matter relating to banking, investments, or payment transactions as either a matter of “fundamental economic practices” or “methods
of organizing human activities.” A knowledgeable supervisory examiner opined
that “it would be ‘very hard’ for applications related to financial subject matter to escape the designation of abstract ideas. The best hope for overcoming
Section 101 rejections appears to be demonstrating that the invention is ‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea itself.”
To further validate the qualitative evidence, I analyzed a number of court decisions following
Alice to measure its impact directly. This analysis is consistent with the conclusion that
financial software has been primarily affected. Please see the Appendix for details.
The decision was officially announced in June 2014, the final month of the October 2013
term. However, the outcome was largely anticipated in the previous months. Because oral
arguments were planned for March 31, 2014, the parties, as well as a large number of other
organizations (the “amici”, in legal terms), had filed their briefs in early 2014. The vast
majority of the briefs argued in favor of CLS Bank56 , suggesting the invalidation of the
patents. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that in March 2014 the public already had a
relatively clear expectation regarding the decision the Supreme Court would make. In fact,
the popular press also documented this process. For example, on March 31, 2014, the day
56
Dennis Crouch of Patently-O provides an overview of the briefs in March 2014.
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/03/software-patent-eligibility.html.
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Please see

of the oral arguments, Ars Technica writes:
Practically no observers expect Alice Corp. to keep its four patents, but the
question of how many other patents get lassoed into today’s decision will resonate for years to come.

5.4. Data
The analysis uses a hand-collected dataset of US-based early-stage software ventures. The
sources required to build this dataset are generally only available in recent times, so I choose
to focus on ventures founded in time window 2012-2016. I choose a random 10% from the
US software venture population and collect data on this subsample57 .
5.4.1. Data Collection Process
To build the core data, I start from Crunchbase (Wu, 2015) and identify the population
of software ventures founded in period 2012-201658 . Crunchbase does not provide clear
information of companies’ activities. So I first select ventures associated with at least one
of the following 7 macro categories: apps, artificial intelligence, data and analytics, gaming,
Internet services, mobile, and software. The resulting list is the population of companies
that are likely to be software-related. I then screen out companies that are not both pureplay software and for-profit. This leads to a target population of 20,807 ventures59 . I
extract a random sample of 2,100 companies (approximately 10% of the population). After
the screening process, I obtain a core dataset of 1,203 pure-play ventures. The final dataset
combines data about product development timing, market, business model, founding team,
patents, funding, and performance.
The central effort involves reconstructing the timing of the key moments of the ventures’
product development process: founding, testing, and launch. I follow an approach similar
to Marx et al. (2014), who assemble a hand-collected dataset of ventures in the speech
recognition industry to examine their strategy choices. I collect these data from company
sources (website, Twitter, Facebook) and media (Google search, Crunchbase news archive,
57

Hand-collecting data on the entire population was not financially and operationally feasible. The random
selection ensures that the findings are generalizable to the population.
58
One may argue that relying on Crunchbase to identify the population of ventures may create itself
a selection bias. I cannot exclude this possibility. However, Crunchbase is largely considered the most
comprehensive dataset of ventures in the US, so there is arguably no better alternative. Additionally, my
understanding is that Crunchbase uses multiple sources to find the companies, and such triangulation appears
to limit the selection bias. When I investigated this issue with Crunchbase staff, a representative described
their data sourcing process as follows: ”Partially crowdfunded, partially through our Venture Program (3500+
investment firms feeding us their portfolio data), partially news publications and government/innovation
agency partnerships, and then partially our data team of 45+ data analysts.”
59
This number is based on a bulk download of Crunchbase data in December 2017.
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PRWeb). I code evidence of disclosure of a preliminary product (“alpha”, “beta”, “pilot”,
“prototype”, “trial”, etc) as experiment and evidence of circulation of the final product
(“formal launch”, “official launch”, etc) as launch. When extracting and coding this information, I focus on the initial product of each venture60 . Besides testing and launch, I
verify and update the time of founding, a piece of information that is generally inaccurate
on Crunchbase. Please see the Appendix for details about this process.
I then assign companies to their most relevant markets. Because there is no established
categorization of software markets, I borrow the categorization of enterprise software used
by Engineering360 and complement it with categories relevant to consumer software. This
process leads to a comprehensive list of 27 markets. Please see the Appendix for details
regarding this process.
I also collect data about other features. First, I collect data about the business model,
including function, revenue model, user type, delivery, and copyright status. This information is hand-collected through the analysis of company sources and is primarily used as
control variables. Second, I collect data about founding teams. I obtain founders’ names
from Crunchbase and collect the relevant information manually from LinkedIn. I use this
information primarily as a control variable. Third, I collect data about patents61 , including issued patents via PatentsView62 and patent applications via PatEx63 (Graham et al.,
2018). The matching of the patent data to ventures was executed via a name-matching
algorithm. Issued patents were matched based on the company name and assignee name.
Patent applications were matched based on the cofounder name and inventor name64 .
Finally, I match the resulting dataset to data about funding and performance, available on
Crunchbase with generally sufficient accuracy. I use forms of early-stage funding (crowdfunding, convertible notes, angel investments) as control variables. I measure performance
60

The qualitative evidence suggests that the vast majority of the ventures in the sample are single-product
ventures. In my interviews, I have only found one case of a venture that developed multiple products. Such
instances are likely to be rare, given that all companies in my sample are at most 5 years old. Therefore,
the single-product assumption seems appropriate, and implies that the analysis should be executed at the
venture-period level.
61
My qualitative work suggests that patenting is the main form of FIP for software ventures, so I focus
on patent data. Another important form is copyright. Copyright protects the expression of the idea,
not the idea itself, but is believed to have value in the software setting. In an interview, a university-based
technology transfer officer suggested that they always recommend both filing a provisional patent application
and registering a copyright. I inquired about obtaining access to data about registered copyrights with the
US Copyright Office but found that the data are accessible only at a prohibitive price.
62
The data are available at http://www.patentsview.org/download/.
63
The
data
are
available
at
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-dataproducts/patent-examination-research-dataset-public-pair.
64
PatEx, based on Public PAIR, also provides information on the organization applying for the patent.
However, matching the cofounder name and inventor name is likely to be more comprehensive when analyzing
early-stage ventures, which may or may not yet be incorporated.
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in terms of survival and size. The survival data include information about time of failure
and time of acquisition.
This procedure created a dataset of 1,203 ventures. In the venture-month panel used in the
analysis, this leads to 53924 observations.
5.4.2. Product Development Timeline
The key outcome variables are experimentation and launch. I define experimentation as the
disclosure of an incomplete product prior to launch and launch as the official introduction
of the product into the market.
I operationalize experimentation as a binary variable that takes the following values: 1 if the
venture is experimenting in that period, 0 if the venture is not experimenting and has not yet
launched. In other words, experimentation is an “absorbing dummy variable”, a dummy
that starts at 0 and turns on when the venture executes its first experiment. Note that
this variable takes a missing value after the company has launched because, by definition,
experimentation cannot take place after launch. Launch is similarly operationalized: 1 if
the venture has launched in or prior to that period, 0 if the venture has not yet launched.
Figure 17 reports the frequency of experimentation and launch in the data. I calculate the
timing of experiment and launch at the month level. Figure 18 illustrates the distribution
of the timing between founding and first experiment and the timing between founding and
launch.
To clarify these constructs, I provide a sample of the qualitative evidence I have collected
through interviews.
Testing is primarily devoted to learning, and that makes it a form of experimentation. In
response to survey question “Why did you choose to test your product?”, the cofounder of
a Chicago-based photo-sharing app venture stated the following:
We did this for many reasons, including usability testing, feature refinement, to
gather insights into onboarding/pricing, and more.
Similarly, an employee of a sales/marketing software company based in San Diego confirmed
they were searching for feedback on the technology and demand:
We wanted to be sure the product worked the way it should and that the market
was interested.
Testing and launch are relatively distinct activities in this setting. However, the difference
58

Figure 17: Frequency of Experimentation and Launch

This figure reports the frequency of testing and launch. Testing is the disclosure of any form of incomplete product
(alpha, beta, pilot, prototype, etc) to the market prior to launch. Launch is the formal introduction of the final
product to the market. Measurement of second and third tests is generally difficult, therefore the analysis focuses on
the first test. The Appendix provides details on the data collection process.

between test and launch is generally not in whether the beta product is free and the final
product is priced: many software companies offer the product for free even after launch.
The distinction is that testing comes with little or no marketing investment, while launch
is primarily a marketing investment. To survey question “What did you do to launch your
product”, a Boston-based financial analytics software founder responded as follows:
We formally launched the product in September 2017 with press release and
several major news articles announcing the release.
Similarly, the marketing manager of an application development platform venture based in
San Francisco suggested the following:
PR tour, analyst briefings, Tech Crunch, blog and email announcements. Tech
Crunch is generally a budget drain, but good for getting a headline.
5.4.3. Alice
The key independent variable – the degree of FIP – is measured based on the 2014 US
Supreme Court decision Alice Corp - CLS Bank International 65 , and . As discussed in
the previous section, this ruling has been widely interpreted as substantially decreasing the
effectiveness of patenting for financial software.
65

Court decisions are increasingly used for causal identification purposes. Examples of studies taking this
approach include Cohen and Wang (2013), Crane and Koch (2018), Amihud and Stoyanov (2017), Licht
et al. (2018), and Mezzanotti (2019).
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Figure 18: Timing of Experimentation and Launch

This figure reports the timing of first test and launch. The vertical lines denote the median values of time to experiment
(11 months) and time to launch (17 months) in the cross-sectional dataset. The Appendix provides details on the
data collection process.

I operationalize Alice as a binary variable that equals 1 starting in March 2014 for ventures
building financial software, and 0 otherwise. Following the approach of Licht et al. (2018),
I choose March 2014 as treatment date, because oral arguments are heard on March 31
2014 and that is when the Supreme Court’s stance is likely to emerge. In the standard
difference-in-differences language, the variable Alice is the interaction between T reatment
and P ost and takes a value of 1 if the venture-period observation is in the treatment group
and takes place on or after March 2014.
It is useful to validate the assumption that Alice has indeed led to a decrease in FIP. If this
assumption is valid, we would expect the affected patent classes to become less popular. The
relevant class for this type of software is class 705 ”Data Processing: Financial, Business
Practice, Management, or Cost/Price Determination” 66 (Hall and MacGarvie, 2010).
Figure 19 reports the time series of the number of patent applications for class 705, the
average number of applications for other software-related classes, and the average number of
applications for all other classes. The figure documents a clear drop in class 705 immediately
after Alice and a much smaller change, on average, in the other classes. While the raw data
show a relatively clear dynamic, the synthetic control method approach (Abadie et al., 2010)
allows a more rigorous comparison.
66

The USPTO defines class 705 as ”the generic class for apparatus and corresponding methods for performing data processing operations, in which there is a significant change in the data or for performing
calculation operations wherein the apparatus or method is uniquely designed for or utilized in the practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or in the processing of financial data.” Please see
https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc705/defs705.htm.
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Figure 19: Time Series of Patent Applications

This figure reports the time series of 1) the number of patent applications in class 705, 2) the average number of patent
applications in software patent classes other than 705 (classes which received at least one application from a software
venture in period 2000-2013), and 3) the average number of patent applications in all patent classes other than 705.
The vertical line denotes the occurrence of Alice (assumed in March 2014). The trend in patent applications in class
705 drops after the event, while there is no clear change in the trend for the other time series.

Figure 20 illustrates the estimated time series of the difference between patent applications
in class 705 and the “synthetic” control group of either software-related classes or all classes.
This analysis confirms the drop in patent applications for class 705 relative to other classes
following the occurrence of Alice.
5.4.4. Market
To build the Alice variable and a number of other independent variables, I assign each
venture to a market. I build a novel categorization of 27 software markets. The Appendix
offers additional details of the categorization.
I need to assign markets to the treatment and control group. To do so, I calculate the ratio
of business software patents over all patents within each market prior to the shock, and
assume markets with high ratio to be in the treatment group. Figure 21 reports the results.
Market “Accounting & Financial” is clearly the outlier, therefore I assume that market to
be the treatment group and the remaining markets to be the control group67 .
67

The main analysis is robust to assuming other plausibly financial markets to be treated.
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Figure 20: Synthetic Control Analysis of Patent Applications

This figure reports the time series of the difference between number of patent applications in class 705 and the synthetic
control group. In the top graph, the synthetic control group is based on patent applications in software patent classes
other than 705 (classes which received at least one application from a software venture in period 2000-2013). In
the bottom graph, the synthetic control group is based on patent applications in all patent classes other than 705.
The light lines are the placebo tests, with each placebo test assuming another given class is treated and building the
synthetic control group using the remaining classes (including 705). The vertical line denotes the occurrence of Alice
(assumed in March 2014). This figure is obtained using STATA command synthrunner (Galiani and Quistorff, 2017)
and is analogous to Figure 4 in Abadie et al. (2010).

5.4.5. Summary Statistics
I employ a variety of other variables throughout the analysis. Table 8 reports the summary
statistics at the cross-sectional level. Table 9 reports summary statistics at the panel level.
I use static (non-time-varying) and dynamic (time-varying) controls. Static controls include
business-model features, which I assume to be stable over time. Dynamic controls include
financing features, which change over time.
Moreover, I measure two moderating variables to run subsample analysis: the degree of
learning incentive and the degree of competition. The basis for constructing these variables
is the category vector that Crunchbase provides for each venture68 . In calculating these
68

There is a total of 713 unique categories in the data. The categories vary from very general (“software”,
“education”) to very specific (“ad targeting”, “supply chain management”).
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Figure 21: Market-Level Data

This figure reports data about the 27 markets composing the software industry. The top graph reports the ratio of
705 patents over all patents per market. The bottom graph reports the average number of ventures per market. In
each graph, the top section includes the treated market (Accounting & Financial) and the bottom section includes
the control markets.

variables, I use the entire software population: all firms that belong to software-related
macro categories founded in the period of 2000-2017.
I measure learning incentive in two ways. First, I measure novelty by calculating the inverse
of the age of the venture’s product category vector (Category Vector Youth). A more novel
product is arguably less understood and thus requires more learning. Second, I measure the
artificial intelligence intensity as the presence of AI-related categories within the venture
category vector (AI Intensity). Because AI is arguably a novel “general purpose technology”,
its application is likely to require some learning. Thus these two measures are proxies for
the incentive to learn that a venture has: when either of these two variables are high, the
venture may need to learn more relative to peers with low values.
I measure competition as the presence of firms building similar products. I use the Jaccard
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Table 8: Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics
Variable
Alice
Experiment
Launch
Failure
Acquisition
Platform
B2B
On Premises
Found Team Size
Mean Jacc Index
Cat Vector Youth
AI Intensity
Direct Comp
Large Direct Comp

Definition
Dummy that equals 1 for ventures founded
in treated markets starting March 2014.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture tests
its product prior to launch.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
launches its product.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
fails.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
gets acquired.
Dummy that equals 1 if
the venture uses a platform strategy.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
sells to enterprises.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
builds a on-premises software product.
Number of venture co-founders.
Average Jaccard Index with all firms
founded prior to venture’s founding.
Log of inverse of age
of category vector.
Presence of AI-related categories
in venture’s category vector.
Number of firms in same market
with Jaccard Index larger than 0.5.
Number of large firms in same market
with Jaccard Index larger than 0.5.

Mean
0.02

SD
0.13

Min
0

Max
1

N
1203

0.58

0.49

0

1

1203

0.83

0.38

0

1

1203

0.21

0.41

0

1

1203

0.08

0.26

0

1

1203

0.38

0.49

0

1

1203

0.51

0.5

0

1

1203

0.09

0.28

0

1

1203

1.92
0.04

0.99
0.03

1
0

5
0.14

1174
1203

8.46

0.57

6.19

8.79

1203

0.14

0.43

0

3

1203

121.19

494.1

0

4579

1203

126.12

494.04

0

4583

1203

This table reports descriptive statistics of the main variables at the venture level. The dataset contains 1,203 ventures.
Variable founding team size is missing for some ventures because data about founding teams were not available.

Index (Bikard, 2012) as measure of similarity. I then calculate two measures of competition:
number of firms within the same market with a Jaccard Index larger than 0.5 (Competition)
and number of large firms within the same market with a Jaccard Index larger than 0.5
(Large-Firm Competition).
While they may appear similar, learning incentive and competition seek to measure different aspects of a venture. Consistently, they are not highly correlated among each other.
Category Vector Youth is only weakly (negatively) correlated with Competition (-0.35) and
Large-Firm Competition (-0.36). AI Intensity is essentially uncorrelated with Competition
(-0.05) and Large-Firm Competition (-0.06).

5.5. Analysis
I test the hypothesis by examining the impact of a decrease in FIP on experimentation. Furthermore, I analize how Alice affects the timing of launch, both conditionally and unconditionally on experimentation. Finally, I explore the role of learning incentive and competition
in these relationships.
5.5.1. Main Analysis
I estimate the impact of Alice on the propensity of experimentation. The ideal experiment
would involve removing the access to FIP for some randomly chosen ventures, while making
no change for the remaining ones. To approximate this scenario, I employ Alice as a “natural
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Table 9: Longitudinal Summary Statistics
Variable
Alice

Definition

Experimentation
Launch
Crowdfunding
Conv Note
Angel
Mean Jacc Index
Cat Vector Youth
AI Intensity
Direct Comp
Large Direct Comp

Dummy that equals 1 for ventures in
treated markets starting March 2014.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
has started testing its product.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
has launched its product.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
receives funding via crowdfunding.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
receives funding via convertible note.
Dummy that equals 1 if the venture
receives funding via angel.
Average Jaccard Index with all firms
founded prior to venture’s founding.
Log of inverse of age of category vector.
Presence of AI-related categories
in venture’s category vector.
Number of firms in same market
with Jaccard Index larger than 0.5.
Number of large firms in same market
with Jaccard Index larger than 0.5.

Mean
0.04

SD
0.19

Min
0

Max
1

N
53924

0.34

0.47

0

1

28256

0.48

0.5

0

1

53924

0.0003

0.02

0

1

53924

0.002

0.04

0

1

53924

0.002

0.04

0

1

53924

0.04

0.03

0

0.14

53924

8.48
0.13

0.53
0.41

6.19
0

8.79
3

53924
53924

128.01

526.9

0

4579

53924

132.95

526.83

0

4583

53924

This table reports descriptive statistics of the main variables at the venture-period level. The dataset contains 1,203
ventures, 72 periods, and 53924 venture-period observations. Variable experimentation is only defined prior to launch,
therefore it is a missing value for venture-period observations after launch.

experiment”. As discussed above, Alice is assumed to affect ventures in the treatment
market (Accounting & Financial) starting in March 2014.
My main specification is a standard difference-in-differences model69 . The independent
variable Alicem,t is the interaction between variables T reatmentm and P ostt . Because I use
venture and period (i.e. year-month) fixed effects, the non-interacted variables T reatmentm
and P ostt are perfectly collinear and must be omitted. I run OLS regressions70 of the
following form:
Expi,t = β Alicem,t + Γ2 X2i,t + Aj + Vi + Pt + i,t

(5.1)

where i is the venture, m is the market, t is the period, Expi,t is a dummy denoting
whether the venture is experimenting, Alicem,t is the Alice dummy (the interaction between
variables T reatmenti and P ostt ), Aj are age fixed effects71 , Vi are venture fixed effects,
Pt are period fixed effects, and X2i,t is a vector dynamic (time-varying) controls. The
venture fixed effects control for the non-time-varying features of each venture, including
the structural characteristics of the market, as ventures do not change markets over time.
Because the treatment affects markets and not ventures individually, it is plausible that
there is correlation across ventures within the same market, so I use standard errors clustered
69

Given the nature of the shock I use, the work by Fricke (2017) suggests that the effect I find is a lower
bound of the treatment effect. More recently, de Chaisemartin and D’HaultfŒuille (2018) argue this is a
fuzzy difference-in-differences design and propose an alternative estimation approach.
70
I run linear regressions primarily using the STATA command reghdfe. I also attempted to use nonlinear
models (logistic and probit) to estimate the equation, but these models generally do not achieve convergence
in this setting, possibly due to the large sample size. Therefore, I rely on the linear probability model.
This seems to be the common approach taken in the literature when using panel data. This has also the
advantage of not removing observations due to the “complete separation” problem.
71
Age is the number of months since founding.
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Table 10: Alice and Experimentation Propensity

Alice
Dyn Controls
Age FEs
Venture FEs
Period FEs
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(1)
(2)
Exp
Exp
Full Sample
-0.016
-0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
28240
28240
0.65
0.65
1.294
6.354
OLS
OLS

(3)
(4)
Exp
Exp
Founded 2012-2013
-0.027∗
-0.027∗
(0.015)
(0.015)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
18156
18156
0.66
0.66
3.154
13.050
OLS
OLS

(5)
(6)
Exp
Exp
Founded 2012
-0.066∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.028)
(0.028)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
10175
10175
0.66
0.66
5.526
65.588
OLS
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on experimentation. The estimation uses equation 5.1. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is experimentation. Static controls include
platform, B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding,
convertible note, and angel. Columns 1-2 use the entire sample, columns 3-4 ventures founded in 2012-2013, and
columns 5-6 ventures founded in 2012.

at the market level throughout the analysis (Bertrand et al., 2004).
I start the analysis by testing the main hypothesis and estimate the impact of FIP on the
ventures’ choice to experiment72 . Table 10 reports the regression analysis based on equation
5.1. Columns 1 and 2 use the entire sample, including both ventures founded prior to the
shock and ventures founded after the shock. While the effect is not significant, the sign
is negative, as expected. Columns 3-6 focus on ventures founded prior to the shock. The
effect is negative and generally more significant, especially when using the oldest ventures
in the data, those founded in 2012.
This first test validates the hypothesis. However, the effect is not strongly significant. In
this setting, experimentation is a dummy that starts at 0, switches to 1 for ventures that
experiment, and, if so, then remains 1 until there is a right-censoring event73 . This outcome
variable has very limited variation. This makes the inference challenging, and may arguably
explain part of the low statistical significance of the results.
Furthermore, this setting has an additional nonstandard element: experimentation is defined
72

I do not analyze the frequency of experimentation because the data on the second test and the third
test are noisy. Ventures typically announce their first test but do so less often for their subsequent tests.
In addition, while the first test and launch are clearly distinguishable, it is difficult to distinguish different
generations of tests. Naturally, questions around experimentation frequency and pacing of experiments
remain interesting and should be examined with the appropriate data.
73
This setting has four sorts of censoring. Experimentation is left-censored in two ways: ventures that
have not started experimenting when the data ends in December 2017 and ventures that fail or are acquired
prior to starting experimentation. Experimentation is right-censored in two ways: ventures that launch and
can no longer experiment and ventures that fail or are acquired prior to launch.
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only prior to launch. Once the venture has launched its product, by definition it can no
longer experiment. Therefore, experimentation is a missing value in all venture-period
observations after launch. To control for this sort of right-censoring, I turn to survival
analysis (Kiefer, 1988; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Cleves et al., 2016; Allison, 2014; Kellogg,
2014). Using the terminology of this approach, the beginning of experimentation is the
“failure event”. I run proportional hazard models of the following form:
h(Expi,t |Xi,t ) = h0 (t) eβ Alicem,t +Γ1 X1i,t +Γ2 X2i,t +Mm +Ft

(5.2)

where i is the venture, m is the market, t is the period, h(Expi,t |Xi,t ) is the hazard of
experimentation Expi,t , Alicem,t is the Alice dummy, Mm are market fixed effects, and Ft
are founding year fixed effects. X1i,t is a vector of static (time-invariant) controls, and
X2i,t is a vector of dynamic (time-varying) controls. I estimate this equation both via
semiparametric models (Cox) and parametric models (Weibull)74 . While it is generally
not feasible to use venture fixed effects in hazard models (Allison and Christakis, 2006), I
control for the non-time-varying factors of the market by including market fixed effects.
Table 11 reports the result of the hazard regressions based on equation 5.2. Alice has a clear
negative effect on the hazard of experimentation. The effect is larger when using Weibull
instead of Cox. In both cases, the negative effect is statistically significant.
Table 11: Alice and Experimentation Hazard

Alice
Static Controls
Dynamic Controls
Market FEs
Founding Year FEs
N
ll
chi2
Estimator

(1)
Exp
0.054
(0.054)

(2)
Exp
-0.159∗∗∗
(0.051)

30873
-4.6e+03
0.989
Cox

x
x
30873
-4.5e+03
2.9e+07
Cox

(3)
Exp
-0.126∗∗
(0.059)
x
x
x
x
30159
-4.4e+03
6.8e+05
Cox

(4)
Exp
-0.032
(0.061)

(5)
Exp
-0.525∗∗∗
(0.041)

30873
-1.8e+03
3.983
Weibull

x
x
30873
-1.7e+03
NA
Weibull

(6)
Exp
-0.483∗∗∗
(0.052)
x
x
x
x
30159
-1.7e+03
NA
Weibull

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on experimentation. The estimation uses equation 5.2. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is time of experimentation. Static controls include
platform, B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding,
convertible note, and angel.
74
Hazard models are executed primarily using STATA commands streg and stcox. With the Cox regressions, I use the Efron approximation. The results are generally unchanged when using alternative
approximations.

67

5.5.2. Robustness
The evidence found so far is consistent with the argument, such that ventures choose not
to experiment when FIP weakens75 . I run a series of robustness checks.
The identification assumption behind the specification used in Equation 5.1 is the parallel
trend condition. To shed light on this, I run a period-specific treatment effect analysis
(Acharya et al., 2014), where I decompose the treatment into a set of period-specific treatment dummies. Figure 22 plots the coefficients from this regression. While confidence
intervals are relatively large, the graph reveals no clear evidence of pre-event differential
behavior.
Figure 22: Period-Specific Treatment Effect

P
This figure reports the coefficients from OLS regression Expi,t = τ =−26,...,+45 βτ λτ + ΓX2i,t + Aj + Vi + Pt + i,t ,
where each λτ is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation is τ periods away from the event and the venture is in the
treatment group, and 0 otherwise. This method is similar to Acharya et al. (2014) Figure 4. The coefficient omitted
from the regression is τ = −26, but the pattern is robust to different omitted coefficients. I report all coefficients.
The vertical line denotes the occurrence of Alice. The top graph uses all venture-period observations. The middle
graph uses ventures founded in 2012-2013. The bottom graph uses ventures founded in 2012.

To further verify the findings, I run a variety of robustness checks. Table 12 reports robust75

Naturally, one may argue that ventures may still be doing “internal experimentation”, running testing
inside the organization in high secrecy. I am unable to observe this. However, this activity does not qualify
as experimentation, given my definition, because it does not imply disclosure and the theorized trade-off
between learning and appropriability does not apply.
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ness checks based on the linear regression analysis of Equation 5.1.
Table 12: Alice and Experimentation Propensity - Robustness Checks

Alice
Dyn Controls
Age FEs
Linear Age
Venture FEs
Market FEs
Period FEs
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(1)
Exp
6M Window
-0.031∗∗∗
(0.010)
x
x

(2)
Exp
Age<17
-0.034∗
(0.019)
x
x

(3)
Exp
Full Sample
-0.026∗
(0.015)
x

x

x

x
x

x
6785
0.80
6.648
OLS

x
15561
0.59
5.035
OLS

x
28240
0.64
18.597
OLS

(4)
Exp
Full Sample
-0.053∗∗∗
(0.019)
x
x

(5)
Exp
Full Sample
-0.039∗∗∗
(0.011)
x
x

x
28256
0.20
1.998
OLS

x
x
28256
0.23
2.750
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on experimentation. The estimation uses equation 5.1. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is experimentation. Static controls include
platform, B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding,
convertible note, and angel. Column 1 restricts the sample to a 6-month window around the event. Column 2 uses
venture-period observations such that age is lower than 17. Column 3 controls for age linearly rather than through
fixed effects. Column 4 removes venture fixed effects. Column 5 replace venture fixed effects with market fixed effects.

Turning to the survival analysis, Table 13 reports robustness checks based on Equation 5.2.
I use two alternative models – Exponential and Gompertz – to verify the negative relation
is robust to different ways of modelling the hazard function.
The additional analysis reinforces the finding that Alice leads ventures to engage less in
experimentation.

The theorized mechanism is that the imitation risk associated with

experimentation increases when FIP is weak, diminishing the expected value of experimenting. Qualitative evidence confirms that ventures perceive the risk of imitation in the
testing process. Regarding the survey question “Why did you choose to test your product?”, the founder of a Baltimore-based marketing software venture suggested the learningappropriability trade-off is indeed perceived:
Feedback is extremely important, but it is extremely difficult to test with the
target market without disclosing details of the project. It is important to define a
use case and target user and, ideally, the product is being built for one customer
and can then be sold or offered to many customers. Most companies we know
test products with a small targeted audience prior to release.
Therefore, absent some degree of patent protection, testing is risky. This explanation is
particularly compelling if the venture has filed a patent or is planning to file a patent when
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Table 13: Alice and Experimentation Hazard - Robustness Checks

Alice
St Controls
Dyn Controls
Market FEs
F Year FEs
N
ll
chi2
Estimator

(1)
Exp
0.054
(0.054)

(2)
Exp
-0.159∗∗∗
(0.051)

30873
-1.8e+03
NA
Exponential

x
x
30873
-1.8e+03
NA
Exponential

(3)
Exp
-0.126∗∗
(0.059)
x
x
x
x
30159
-1.7e+03
NA
Exponential

(4)
Exp
-0.032
(0.061)

(5)
Exp
-0.525∗∗∗
(0.041)

30873
-1.7e+03
NA
Gompertz

x
x
30873
-1.7e+03
NA
Gompertz

(6)
Exp
-0.483∗∗∗
(0.052)
x
x
x
x
30159
-1.6e+03
NA
Gompertz

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on experimentation. The estimation uses equation 5.2. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is time of experimentation. Static controls include
platform, B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding,
convertible note, and angel.

the shock occurs. However, this is also plausible if the venture is not planning to file a
patent. In the US-based “first-to-file” system, the decrease in the potential opportunity of
patenting may also lead to a change in behavior. While perhaps the effect would be larger
in the former case, the mechanism is plausible in both cases.
The primary alternative explanation is the risk of infringement. Being involved in a patent
infringement lawsuit is often too costly for a venture. Alice has diminished the risk of
infringement, by making the enforcement of business-software patents less effective76 . If
the risk of infringement is low, new ventures are able to experiment more. For example,
part of the process of bringing a product to the market involves a patent search, but that
is less important if the risk of infringement is low. I do not observe a positive relationship,
so the first-order effect of this mechanism may not be at play77 .
76

As an illustration of this scenario, the Electronic Frontier Foundation discusses an informative example
in support of this view: “Instead of funding its growth, Ordrx was bleeding capital. During the two-year
period while the litigation was most active, the company spent as much on legal bills as it did on salaries for
its workers. David did not pay himself at all during that time which was a significant hardship for his young
family. Capital that should have helped the company grow was funneled to legal fees. Growth stalled, and then
Ordrx folded. David had to tell 40 people that they no longer had jobs. [...] If Alice had been the law when
Ordrx was sued in 2012, it could have responded to the suit with a motion to dismiss. Many district courts
have found patent claims invalid under Alice early in the litigation. This avoids the massive cost of discovery
and trial. Unfortunately for David, the Supreme Court did not issue the Alice ruling until two years after
his company had been sued.” Please see https://www.eff.org/alice/alice-arrives-too-late-save-startup.
77
At the same time, this factor may operate indirectly, by changing the ideation process earlier on. If the
risk of infringement is low, ventures may be less incentivized to build differentiated products. Even if their
products infringe on other firms’ patents, the expected legal cost is low. If ventures build less differentiated
products, the value of learning is reduced, and thus, the need for experimenting is also lower. I cannot
exclude this explanation.
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Table 14: Alice and Launch Hazard

Alice
St Controls
Dyn Controls
Market FEs
Founding Year FEs
N
ll
chi2
Estimator

(1)
Launch
0.153∗∗∗
(0.032)

(2)
Launch
0.256∗∗∗
(0.060)

28021
-6.1e+03
23.481
Cox

x
x
28021
-6.1e+03
1.6e+07
Cox

(3)
Launch
0.192∗∗∗
(0.064)
x
x
x
x
27554
-5.9e+03
6.5e+05
Cox

(4)
Launch
0.131∗∗∗
(0.034)

(5)
Launch
0.130∗∗∗
(0.044)

28021
-1.6e+03
NA
Weibull

x
x
28021
-1.5e+03
NA
Weibull

(6)
Launch
0.073
(0.050)
x
x
x
x
27554
-1.5e+03
Weibull

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on launch. The estimation uses equation 5.2. Each column reports
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars denote * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is time of launch. Static controls include platform, B2B, on-premises,
and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding, convertible note, and angel.

5.5.3. Timing of Launch
The analysis shows that the occurrence of Alice leads early-stage ventures to experiment less,
supporting the hypothesis. As ventures change their experimentation propensity, they may
or may not change the rest of their strategy. In principle, they may avoid experimentation
and simply “sit in the lab” until the product is ready for commercialization. Alternatively,
Alice may change the timing of the launch decision. It may postpone the launch decision
if the lack of learning via experimentation makes the product development process slower.
It may accelerate the launch decision if the venture essentially compensates the lack of
experimentation with faster time to market.
I use equation 5.2 to examine the effect of Alice on the timing of launch. Table 14 reports the results. Once again, I use two different approaches (Cox, Weibull). Alice has a
strong positive effect on the hazard of launch. Product launch is generally associated with
investments in marketing. This effort may generate a series of complementary assets, such
as customer base, brand recognition, and network effects. Such assets create barriers to
launch, a form of IIP. If FIP is no longer a feasible option, ventures may therefore choose
to move faster and launch the product, protecting the product through IIP78 .
I repeat the analysis conditionally and unconditionally on experimentation in Table 15.
This analysis should be taken cautiously: conditioning on experimentation is essentially a
78

An alternative explanation that may be lead ventures to go to market faster may be the incentive to
signal performance to stakeholders. The literature (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Conti et al., 2013) suggests that
early-stage ventures often use patents as signals of quality to obtain investments. When patents are no longer
available, ventures may choose to launch the market faster and signal quality through their performance.
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Table 15: Alice, Experimentation, and Launch Hazard

Alice
St Controls
Dyn Controls
Market FEs
F Year FEs
N
ll
chi2
Estimator

(1)
(2)
(3)
Exp
Exp
Exp
Conditional on Not Experimenting
0.021
0.297∗∗∗
0.322∗∗∗
(0.050)
(0.106)
(0.092)
x
x
x
x
x
x
9637
9637
9440
-2.4e+03 -2.4e+03
-2.3e+03
0.174
1.7e+06
2.0e+05
Cox
Cox
Cox

(4)
(5)
(6)
Exp
Exp
Exp
Conditional on Experimenting
0.217∗∗∗
0.115
0.059
(0.047)
(0.077)
(0.085)
x
x
x
x
x
x
18384
18384
18114
-3.0e+03 -3.0e+03 -2.9e+03
21.383
1.3e+07
2.1e+05
Weibull
Weibull
Weibull

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on launch. The estimation uses equation 5.2. Each column reports
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars denote * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is time of launch. Static controls include platform, B2B, on-premises,
and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding, convertible note, and angel.

form of selecting on the dependent variables. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see how the
relationship between Alice and launch timing varies among ventures that do experiment
and ventures that do not. The effect is stronger among ventures not experimenting.
5.5.4. Learning
By diminishing the effectiveness of FIP, Alice leads ventures to experiment less and launch
earlier. I argue that this pattern is driven by the learning-appropriability tension. To provide further evidence of this channel, I examine a critical moderating factor, the learning
incentive. If the main benefit of experimentation is learning, ventures with stronger learning
incentive should be less sensitive to Alice in terms of their experimentation strategy. Additionally, if early launch is motivated by need for learning, ventures with stronger learning
incentive should respond more to Alice in terms of time to launch.
I analyze the impact of Alice for the different subsets of my sample79 : ventures with high
incentive to learn and ventures with low incentive to learn. As discussed in section 4, I
measure learning incentive with novelty (inverse age of category vector) and AI intensity
(presence of AI-related categories in category vector).
I first examine how the Alice effect on experimentation changes depending on the learning incentive. Table 16 suggests that the negative effect of Alice is stronger for ventures
with low need for learning, when learning incentive is measured in terms of AI. However,
79
An alternative way to run this analysis is by adding interaction terms. However, interactions are not
easily interpreted in non-linear models. Therefore, for consistency across the two tests, I use subsample
analysis.
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Table 16: Alice, Experimentation, and Learning Incentive

Alice
Dyn Controls
Age FEs
Venture FEs
Period FEs
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(1)
(2)
Exp
Exp
Novelty
Low
High
-0.011
-0.012
(0.026) (0.017)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
9499
18741
0.66
0.64
33.722
1.324
OLS
OLS

(3)
Exp

(4)
Exp

AI
Low
High
-0.061∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.015)
(0.041)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
24702
3538
0.65
0.65
8.929
56.984
OLS
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on experimentation. The estimation uses equation 5.1. Each
column reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is experimentation. Static controls include
platform, B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding,
convertible note, and angel. Column 1 uses ventures with low novelty, column 2 ventures with high novelty, column
3 ventures with low AI, and column 4 ventures with high AI. Novelty is measured by logarithm of the inverse of the
age of the category vector (low = below median, high = above median). AI Intensity is measured by presence of
AI-related categories in the category vector (low = zero, high = one or more).

when learning incentive is measured in terms of novelty, there is no difference between the
subsamples, and the effect is not significant.
This pattern is consistent with the idea that experimentation is valuable only when learning
is particularly important. Alternatively, in situations in which there is little uncertainty,
experimentation is not strictly necessary. A quote from the co-founder of a San Francisco
marketing software venture perfectly exemplifies this scenario:
We did not run any tests before getting clients to use our product. This is
because our product solved a problem that we had previously experienced ourselves, and we had a strong sense of what solutions would be well received. We
also use our product internally, and it successfully solves the problems it was designed for. If our product were more hypothesis based, and we designed it purely
based on external research and identifying needs, it would be more important
to test it.
I use hazard equation 5.2 to examine the role of learning incentive on timing of launch. Table
17 shows that the positive effect of Alice on the launch hazard is stronger for ventures with
low incentive to learn. This pattern suggests that ventures building a novel product need a
longer development time and thus do not accelerate their development process despite not
being able to receive market feedback.
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Table 17: Alice, Launch, and Learning Incentive

Alice
St Controls
Dyn Controls
Market FEs
Founding Year FEs
N
ll
chi2
Estimator

(1)
(2)
Launch
Launch
Novelty
Low
High
0.526∗∗∗
-0.054
(0.121)
(0.084)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
9233
18321
-1.7e+03 -3.5e+03
9.0e+05
2.2e+06
Cox
Cox

(3)
(4)
Launch
Launch
AI Intensity
Low
High
0.198∗∗∗
-0.186
(0.063)
(0.378)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
24141
3413
-5.2e+03 -378.899
7.8e+05 1.3e+05
Cox
Cox

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on launch. The estimation uses equation 5.2. Each column reports
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars denote * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is time of launch. Static controls include platform, B2B, on-premises,
and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding, convertible note, and angel.
Column 1 uses ventures with low novelty, column 2 ventures with high novelty, column 3 ventures with low AI, and
column 4 ventures with high AI. Novelty is measured by logarithm of the inverse of the age of the category vector
(low = below median, high = above median). AI Intensity is measured by presence of AI-related categories in the
category vector (low = zero, high = one or more).

5.5.5. Competition
I perform a similar exercise with another critical moderating factor, the degree of competition80 . The cost of experimentation – the threat of imitation – is higher when the venture
operates in a market space with high competition. If this argument is valid, we would
expect that the degree of competition plays a role.
I examine the effect of Alice on experimentation for different levels of competition in Table 18, using equation 5.1. As discussed, I measure competition in terms of number of
firms and number of large firms building product sufficiently similar to the venture (Jaccard Index>0.5). The negative effect is strongest in the subsample of ventures facing high
competition.
This pattern is consistent with the common wisdom. For example. The Economist discusses
the perception among VC investors that early-stage ventures operating in market spaces
too close to large firms are at high risk of imitation81 :
80
Competition appears to interact in interesting ways with the degree of uncertainty of the product
development process. In experimental work, Boudreau et al. (2011) find that higher uncertainty increases
the positive effect of competition on quality of idea in the context of innovation tournaments.
81
The original article is available at www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/americantechgiantsaremakinglifetoughforstartups. Additional discussion is available at promarket.org/googlefacebookskillzonewevetakenfocusoffrewardinggeniusinnovationrewardingcapitalscale/.
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Table 18: Alice, Experimentation, and Competition

Alice
Dyn Controls
Age FEs
Venture FEs
Period FEs
N
adj. R2
F
Estimator

(1)
(2)
Exp
Exp
Competition
Low
High
0.038∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.021)
(0.018)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
13914
14326
0.63
0.67
13.121
15.357
OLS
OLS

(3)
(4)
Exp
Exp
Large-Firm Competition
Low
High
0.090∗∗∗
-0.135∗∗∗
(0.023)
(0.019)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
14308
13932
0.63
0.67
6.585
47.567
OLS
OLS

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on experimentation. The estimation uses equation 5.1. Each column
reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars denote
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is experimentation. Static controls include platform,
B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding, convertible
note, and angel. Column 1 uses ventures with low competition, column 2 ventures with high competition, column 3
ventures with low large-firm competition, and column 4 ventures with high large-firm competition. Competition is
measured by the number of firms in the same market and with Jaccard Index higher than 0.5 relative to the focal
venture (low = below median, high = above median). Large-firm competition is measured by the number of firms
with at least 1000 employees in the same market and with Jaccard Index higher than 0.5 relative to the focal venture
(low = below median, high = above median).

Venture capitalists, such as Albert Wenger of Union Square Ventures, who was
an early investor in Twitter, now talk of a “kill-zone” around the giants. Once
a young firm launchs, it can be extremely difficult to survive. Tech giants try
to squash startups by copying them, or they purchase them early to eliminate
a threat.
Table 19 examines the effect of Alice on the launch hazard of ventures facing low and high
competition. There is evidence that the effect is more pronounced for ventures facing low
competition. An interpretation is that ventures may choose to speed up launch when the
market is not competitive, and thus they can gain a first-mover advantage. Instead, when
the market is competitive, rushing to market is not helpful, and waiting and building a
more developed product becomes a more attractive strategy.

5.6. Discussion
I discuss the limitations of this study and how to address them in future work.
While the effects go in the hypothesized direction, statistical significance is not always
strong. Part of this problem depends on the very nature of the setting: experimentation,
as measured here, is a variable which has little variation. While the literature suggests that
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Table 19: Alice, Launch, and Competition

Alice
St Controls
Dyn Controls
Market FEs
Founding Year FEs
N
ll
chi2
Estimator

(1)
(2)
Launch
Launch
Competition
Low
High
1.145∗∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗
(0.095)
(0.124)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
13547
14007
-2.5e+03 -2.8e+03
3.5e+05
1.1e+06
Cox
Cox

(3)
(4)
Launch
Launch
Large-Firm Competition
Low
High
0.670∗∗∗
-0.294∗∗∗
(0.090)
(0.108)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
13940
13614
-2.5e+03
-2.7e+03
4.0e+05
3.1e+06
Cox
Cox

This table reports estimates of the impact of Alice on launch. The estimation uses equation 5.2. Each column
reports coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at market level. Stars denote
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The outcome variable is time of launch. Static controls include platform,
B2B, on-premises, and founding team size. Dynamic controls include three lagged values of crowdfunding, convertible
note, and angel. Column 1 uses ventures with low competition, column 2 ventures with high competition, column 3
ventures with low large-firm competition, and column 4 ventures with high large-firm competition. Competition is
measured by the number of firms in the same market and with Jaccard Index higher than 0.5 relative to the focal
venture (low = below median, high = above median). Large-firm competition is measured by the number of firms
with at least 1000 employees in the same market and with Jaccard Index higher than 0.5 relative to the focal venture
(low = below median, high = above median).

we should move away from the focus on specific P-value cutoffs (Wasserstein and Lazar,
2016), the analysis would be more robust in a larger sample. As I discuss in Section 4, the
complexity of the data collection process made it prohibitively difficult to collect the data
via code. Having to use hand-collection naturally limited the size of the sample. However,
the sample I have built may now serve as a “training set” that could help find a way to
automate at least part of the process. It should be possible to write a code that implements
the time-consuming steps of the data collection process82 . Once the code functions properly,
we can test its accuracy using this training set and improve it up to a sufficient level, and
finally scale the analysis to the entire population.
The key mechanism is learning. While I measure whether firms experiment (i.e. seek to
learn), I do not concretely measure whether and what they learn. Naturally, measuring
learning is difficult. One way to go is to measure the nature of the feedback and the
following adaptation process. Depending on the feedback that a venture receives from
the experiment, it may choose to adapt in different ways, such as changing the product,
changing the market, and changing the business model. Because there is no clear data
82

Specifically, the code needs to perform two tasks: collect and analyze information about product development timing and assign ventures to their focal market. The first task is essentially a text analysis task
(O’Connor et al., 2011; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). The second task is a classification exercise and can be
effectively executed through methodologies such as support vector machines or neural networks.
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source to obtain this information, this is probably a fruitful direction for qualitative work.
The venture team is likely to play a central role in the experimentation process83 . In this
dataset, as the team was not central to the analysis, I collected only basic information on
the founding team. However, different teams may have different “experimentation capabilities”, and thus gain differentially from experimenting. To analyze this aspect, I need to
collect detailed, time-varying data about team members, including education and experience. Again, the ability to shift this process from hand-collection to automated collection
is necessary to be able to analyze a large dataset.
An additional piece that may be relevant to this analysis is the upfront cost of circulating
a beta test, especially the price of cloud computing Ewens et al. (2018). Obtaining pricing
data from the cloud computing market may help control for this factor. This would also
require measuring the prevalence of cloud computing across different software markets, a
challenging piece of data to find.
Finally, external validity is limited in this study. The software industry is particularly fitting for the study of experimentation, due to its low upfront cost of experimentation. While
trends such as 3D printing and computer-aided design are rapidly decreasing the cost of
experimentation in hardware and manufacturing (Khorram Niaki and Nonino, 2017), software remains to some extent a special case. This limits the confidence with which we can
generalize the findings to other settings. Therefore, a potential next step is to examine this
process in a setting where the cost of experimentation is high, such as hardware, transportation, or healthcare. Many of these industries84 are going through rapid transformation, and
learning is likely to play a central role.

83

Outside the context of experimentation, the team may affect product development in a variety of ways.
For example, classic work by Brooks (1975) suggests the so-called “Brooks’ Law”: adding manpower to a
late software project makes it later. Increasing the team size later in a project makes coordination costly
and leads to additional delay.
84
Transportation is a fascinating example. Some of the recent trends – such as Uber’s Project Elevate – may
introduce fundamental new paradigms into the industry. This kind of transformations involves substantial
uncertainty, so experimentation is critical. At the same time, regulation and investment requirements make
experimentation challenging.
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CHAPTER 6 : Conclusion
6.1. Contributions to Research
This dissertation contributes to four streams of work in the academic literature in strategic
management: entrepreneurship, organizational learning, structure, and appropriability.
The literature on entrepreneurship is perhaps the area where this dissertation contributes
most. Early-stage ventures may choose between two alternative strategic routes: an adaptive approach and a predictive approach. The adaptive approach involves obtaining information through early contact with the market and iterating towards the final product. The
predictive approach relies on information obtained through research and internal development, and postpones interaction with the market to a later stage. A recent stream of work
in entrepreneurial strategy (Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2017; Gans et al., 2019) explores this
dichotomy. This dissertation offers a novel framework to conceptualize experimentation and
its key tradeoffs, directly contributing to this conversation.
This dissertation also speaks to the literature on organizational learning. While this stream
of work has highlighted the behavioral limitations of learning (Levinthal and March, 1993),
there has been little systematic examination of the “strategic costs of learning”, especially
in the context of early-stage ventures. This dissertation focuses on one type of learning
– purposeful, experiential learning (Murray and Tripsas, 2004) – and highlights how this
approach implies strategic costs, primarily in relation to adaptation and appropriability.
Part of this dissertation contributes to the literature on organizational structure. Currently, there is no common view on the role of formal structure in entrepreneurial ventures.
A traditional view suggests that early-stage firms should have a flexible structure (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). A more recent perspective emphasizes the advantages of formal
structure in environments where speed matters (Sine et al., 2006). The evidence found in
Chapter 4 suggests that structure is complementary to strategy. If a venture relies on an
experimentation-driven strategy, a high degree of formal structure may not be an effective
approach.
Finally, part of this dissertation speaks to the literature on appropriability. The analysis of Chapter 5 suggests that experimentation may be one of the channels that reduces
firms’ ability to appropriate value. Furthermore, by focusing on the software industry, this
work contributes to the understanding of appropriability in digital environments, a domain
recently analyzed by the literature (Teece, 2018; Miric et al., ress).
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6.2. Implications for Practice
Beyond contributing to the academic literature, this dissertation seeks to generate relevant
insights for practice (Toffel, 2016). This work may have potential implications for three
categories of practitioners: entrepreneurs, investors, and policy makers.
First, these findings may be relevant to founders and managers of early-stage ventures. The
theoretical analysis and the empirical evidence suggest that the use of experimentation can
be costly. The “one-size-fits-all” approaches – such as the Lean Startup – may sometimes
be counter productive, because the use of experimentation has boundary conditions. Therefore, when strategizing around development and entry, entrepreneurs should take this into
account. This broader perspective may ventures to reduce or avoid experimentation in some
cases, or perhaps experiment while designing countermeasures to minimize its associated
costs.
Second, this study may be informative for investors. Currently many investors appear
to value experimentation when evaluating ventures. For example, Roger Ehrenberg of IA
Ventures writes85 ”Our fundamental view at IA is that our pre-product/market fit, pre-Series
A investments look a lot like experiments, and we bond well with founders who embrace this
mind-set.” While I do not provide a causal impact of experimentation, the analysis suggests
that, under some conditions, experimentation does not improve ventures’ chances of survival
and growth. The implication for investors, therefore, is to carefully consider the amount and
the type of experimentation the target venture is engaging in prior to making investment
decisions, paying particular attention to its consequences in terms of appropriability.
Finally, this work may have implications for public policy. If experimentation is socially
valuable, policy-makers can influence the environmental factors that hinder experimentation. In particular, the evidence found here shows that a weaker FIP environment leads
ventures to do less experimentation. If experimentation is optimal in markets with high
uncertainty, this may limit the survival of ventures that are building radically innovative
products. In the longer run, this may also lead fewer entrepreneurs to build radically innovative products. This dynamic may have, beyond private costs, substantial social costs.
While there are other disadvantages of strong patent protection (Boldrin and Levine, 2013),
the design of FIP should take into account its impact on entrepreneurial experimentation.
85
Please see
article-title-like.

www.linkedin.com/pulse/my-approach-venture-investing-roger-ehrenberg/?trk=hp-feed-
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6.3. Open Questions
While providing a series of insights, this work generates a number of open questions about
the nature and the role of experimentation in entrepreneurship. I conclude this dissertation
by discussing the most fascinating ones.
Starting at the micro level, it seems important to consider the individual-level process
preceding the process of experimentation. The theoretical framework of this dissertation
essentially assumes that the entrepreneur has the motivation to start a venture and an
initial idea. Naturally, this simplification rules out the processes of choosing to become an
entrepreneur (Åstebro et al., 2014) and generating a business idea (Girotra et al., 2010).
Therefore, it may be fruitful to rethink the role of experimentation in the broader context
of the entrepreneurial process. Depending on the nature of the motivation for starting a
venture and the timing of idea generation, experimentation may play largely different roles.
Moving to the process of experimentation, a critical challenge is measurement. In this dissertation, this required lengthy hand-coding work, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. One
way to solve this issue could be the use of the recent technical advances in natural language
processing. Following some pioneering work (Tetlock et al., 2008), it is now clear that text
is a massive opportunity for empirical analysis. Recently, a growing literature uses natural
language processing to explore questions around innovation – for example, Giorcelli et al.
(2019) examine the diffusion of key scientific concepts in the cultural and social discourse.
Using this class of techniques, it may be possible to measure experimentation in multiple
ways, such as quantifying the presence of experimentation-related keywords (i.e. MVP, prototype, etc) or the change over time in the way ventures describe their business. In addition,
this type of data might be appropriate for predictive analysis (Kleinberg et al., 2015), a
potentially interesting avenue the literature in entrepreneurship has not yet explored.
Beyond measurement, another major challenge is, perhaps unsurprisingly, internal validity.
Estimating the causal impact of experimentation on performance using observational data
requires finding an instrumental variable – this is a challenging task in this context. To solve
this problem, an alternative way is to design a randomized controlled trial (Duflo et al.,
2008). A growing literature – for example Eesley and Wu (2017), Camuffo et al. (2018), and
Chatterji et al. (2019) – uses this approach to answer questions relevant to entrepreneurship.
In this context, one would need to design a situation where a randomly chosen subsample
of entrepreneurial teams is induced to do more experimentation. A potentially valuable
setting to do this is to exploit a venture competition and provide different training programs,
following the classic work by Boehm et al. (1984). Besides an in-person venture competition,
other interesting settings include online innovation contests (Boudreau et al., 2011) and
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online labor platforms (Lyons, 2017).
As widely discussed in these pages, the primary benefit of experimentation is the acquisition
of information about the market early in the development process. Naturally, the way this
information is acquired has been rapidly changing due to the advent of AI (Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2017; Agrawal et al., 2018; Felten et al., 2018). Hence, it seems important to
explore the role of AI in the process of entrepreneurial experimentation. Theoretically, AI
increases the learning capability of ventures possessing these capabilities. On the other
hand, the technological uncertainty around this novel class of tools may have interesting
and possibly unexpected implications on competition.
The strategy literature has emphasized how most firms operate within an ecosystem (Kapoor
and Lee, 2013; Adner and Kapoor, 2016). Increasingly common types of ecosystems take
the form of platforms (Cennamo and Santalo, 2013), where a platform owner and various
groups of complementors interact strategically. In an era of increasing oligopoly in hightechnology industries, a large number of new ventures are indeed complementors within
platforms. Hence, it is important to think about the experimentation process for complementors, given the dyanmics and the constraints of platforms.
This dissertation has implicitly assumed ventures operating in settings with strong institutions, particularly from the perspective of IP. However, it is well-known that numerous
regions around the world have institutional settings where FIP is not strongly enforced.
Therefore, it is important to study the nature of experimentation in settings with weak
FIP, where the imitation risks associated with experimentation are higher and ventures
perhaps rely on interesting forms of IIP. Naturally, given its centrality within the world
economy, China is a promising setting for this research question, as demonstrated by recent
work (Huang et al., 2017).
Finally, it is useful to consider the macro level. The experimental view of entrepreneurship
(Rosenberg, 1983) emphasizes the social value of failure. Ventures are experiments, and
evolutionary forces lead to the survival of the best equipped ones, generating innovation
and moving society forward. While socially valuable, failure is privately very costly. To
have a full understanding of experimentation, we need to explore the private costs of failure
and find ways to alleviate them.
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CHAPTER 7 : Appendix
7.1. Proofs
I report the proofs for the propositions of Chapter 3. Proposition 3.1 summarizes the analysis of the model with discrete product location. Propositions 3.2, 3.3, and 3.3 summarize
the analysis for the model with continuous product location.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. I proceed by backward induction. I first analyze each terminal node and then compare the expected payoffs at the initial node.
At node 1, choosing A has payoff µπ and choosing B has payoff (1 − µ)π. Because µ ≥ 0.5,
A is optimal.
At node 2, following S = Â, chosing A has payoff (µ + Q)π − k and choosing B has payoff
1 − µ − Q. Because µ ≥ 0.5 and Q is positive, A is optimal.
At node 2, following S = B̂, chosing A has payoff (µ − T )π − k and choosing B has payoff
(1 − µ − T )π − k. Comparing the payoffs, moving to B is optimal when σ 2 ≥
Instead, staying in A is optimal when σ 2 <
For simplicity, I will be defining G(µ, θ) =

(2µ−1)(1−µ)
.
2θ

(2µ−1)(1−µ)
.
2θ

(2µ−1)(1−µ)
2θ

=

3µ−2µ2 −1
.
2θ

This function is always

positive and, with θ = 1, it is bounded between 0 and 0.125.
First, I examine the case σ 2 < G(µ, θ). The expected payoff following XE, prior to receiving
the signal, is P R(S = Â|p)(µπ + Qπ − k) + P R(S = B̂|p)(µπ − T π − k). I take the
expectation over p using the prior distribution. Comparing the resulting DE and XE, I
obtain the following
µπ > P R(S = Â|p)(µπ + Qπ − k) + P R(S = B̂|p)(µπ − T π − k)
hence, in region σ 2 < G(µ, θ), DE is optimal.
Second, I examine the case σ 2 ≥ G(µ, θ). The expected payoff following XE, prior to
receiving the signal is, P R(S = Â|p)(µπ + Qπ − k) + P R(S = B̂|p)(π − µπ − T π − k). I
take the expectation over p using the prior distribution. Comparing the resulting payoffs of
DE and XE, σ 2 ≥ G(µ, θ) +

k
2θπ

the following holds

µπ ≤ P R(S = Â|p)(µπ + Qπ − k) + P R(S = B̂|p)(π − µπ − T π − k)
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While for σ 2 < G(µ, θ) +

k
2θπ

the following holds

µπ > P R(S = Â|p)(µπ + Qπ − k) + P R(S = B̂|p)(π − µπ − T π − k)
hence, in region σ 2 ≥ G(µ, θ), XE is optimal if σ 2 ≥ G(µ, θ) +
σ2

∈ [G(µ, θ), G(µ, θ) +

k
2θπ

while DE is optimal if

k
2θπ ).

Return to Section 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. I proceed by backward induction. I first analyze each terminal node and then compare the expected payoffs at the initial node.


At node 1, the expected payoff is Ez [Π(a, z)] = Ez α − β(a − z)2 . The FOC leads to a∗ = i.
The SOC is negative, so this is a maximum. Plugging a∗ back in, the expected payoff is
π1 = Ez [Π(a∗ , z)] = α − βσ 2 .


At node 2, the expected payoff is Ez [Π(a, z)|s] = Ez α − β(a − z)2 |s − k. The FOC leads
to a∗∗ = E(z|s). The SOC is negative, so this is a maximum. Plugging a∗∗ back in, the
expected payoff is π2 = Ez [Π(a∗∗ , z)] = α − β

1
1
+θ
σ2

− k.

Comparing the payoffs leads to
α−β

1
σ2

1
− k ≥ α − βσ 2
+θ

Re-arranging this equation leads to the inequality reported in the proposition.
Return to Section 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. I proceed similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.2.


At node 1, the expected payoff is Ez [Π(a, z)|s] = Ez α − β(a − z)2 |s − φ(a − i)2 . The
FOC leads to a∗ = i. The SOC is negative, so this is a maximum. Plugging a∗ back in, the
expected payoff is π1 = Ez [Π(a∗ , z)] = α − βσ 2 , similarly to the basic model.


At node 2, the expected payoff is Ez [Π(a, z)|s] = Ez α − β(a − z)2 |s − k − φ(a − i)2 . The
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β
β+φ E(z|s)

FOC leads to a∗∗ =
be defining Q =

β
β+φ

and T =

+

φ
β+φ i.

φi
β+φ ,

The SOC is negative, so this is a maximum. I will

so that a∗∗ = Q E(z|s) + T .

Plugging a∗∗ back in, I obtain
β
+
π2 = α − k −
M

!
− βT 2 − φT 2 − φi2 + 2φiT

δ 2 i2 θ2 s2 2δiθs
+
+
+
M2
M2
M2

δi θs
+2
+
M M

!

!
βT − βT Q + φiQ − φT Q

!

!
2

2

− βQ − φQ + 2βQ − β

This is the amount conditional on s. Before s arrives, I take the expectation over all possible
values of s. Taking the expectation over s, I obtain
β
π2 = α − k −
+
M

!
2

2

2

− βT − φT − φi + 2φiT

δ 2 i2 θ2 (z 2 + 1θ ) 2δiθz
+
+
+
M2
M2
M2

δi θz
+2
+
M M

!

!
βT − βT Q + φiQ − φT Q

!

!
2

2

− βQ − φQ + 2βQ − β

Finally, as z is unknown, I calculate the expectation based on the prior. Taking the expectation over z, substituting σ 2 for δ, and re-arranging the terms, I obtain the final payoff
!
π2 = α − k +

+

( σ12

1
+ θ)2

2

2

2

− βT − φT − φi + 2φiT

2θi2
i2
2 2
2 2
+
θ
+
θ
i
+
θ
σ
+
σ4
σ2

!
+ 2i βT − βT Q + φiQ − φT Q

!

!
− βQ2 − φQ2 + 2βQ − β

−

1
σ2

β
+θ

Comparing the payoffs leads to the inequality reported in the proposition.
Return to Section 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. I proceed similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.3.
As in the previous model, the expected payoff at node 1 is π1 = Ez [Π(a∗ , z)] = α − βσ 2 .


At node 2, the expected payoff is Ez [Π(a, z)|s] = Ez R α − β(a − z)2 |s − k − φ(a − i)2 . The
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FOC leads to a∗∗ =
will be defining Q =

φ
Rβ
Rβ+φ E(z|s) + Rβ+φ i.
Rβ
φi
Rβ+φ and T = Rβ+φ ,

The SOC is negative, so this is a maximum. I
so that a∗∗ = Q E(z|s) + T .

Following the same procedure of proposition 3.3, I obtain the final payoff
!
π2 = Rα − k +

+

( σ12

1
+ θ)2

− RβT 2 − φT 2 − φi2 + 2φiT

i2
2θi2
2 2
2 2
+
θ
+
θ
i
+
θ
σ
+
σ4
σ2

!
+ 2i RβT − RβT Q + φiQ − φT Q

!

!
2

2

− RβQ − φQ + 2RβQ − Rβ

−

Rβ
+θ

1
σ2

Comparing the payoffs leads to the inequality.
Return to Section 3.5.

7.2. Codebook for Venture Competition Data
The codebook contains 17 sections: Section 0 (basic information from application form),
Sections 1 to 7 (information about members, one section per member, up to seven), Section
8 (information about sector from application form), Section 9 (information about strategy
from pitch deck), Sections 10 to 16 (information about members, one section per member,
up to seven), section 17 (information about affiliations from pitch deck).
While the full codebook is available upon request, I list the items that provided the information to build the experimentation and planning variables:
• Focus on Experimentation [exp focus] (an experiment is an early-stage product typically, the terminology used to describe this includes minimum viable product
(MVP), beta, test, prototype, pilot,)
– 0 - Experiment is never mentioned
– 1 - Experiment is mentioned at least once, but it does not mostly occupy one
slide
– 2 - Experiment has one slide fully dedicated to it
– 3 - Experiment has at least two slides fully dedicated to it
• Timing of Experimentation [exp time] (when the experiment is to be conducted)
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– 0 - Experiment is never mentioned
– 1 - Experiment to be produced in the future
– 2 - Experiment has been done in the past or is currently ongoing
• Market research [mkt res] (market research includes discussion of competitors and
customers)
– 0 - Market research is not provided
– 1 - Market research is provided in some form, but there is NO detailed quantitative description of competitors and customers
– 2 - Market research is provided extensively, including detailed quantitative description of competitors and customers
• Financial Planning [fin planning] (financial planning refers to explicit calculation or
forecast of future revenues of the company and is often reported through a graph or
a table)
– 0 - Financial planning is not discussed
– 1 - Financial planning is discussed in some form, but there is NO description of
specific future anticipated financials for multiple years
– 2 - Financial planning is described extensively, including description of specific
future anticipated financials for multiple years
• Operational Timeline [timeline] (description of how the project has developed so far
and how it will develop in the future)
– 0 - Timeline is not provided
– 1 - Timeline is provided in some form, but there is NO detailed graphical overview
of the operational steps the companies took and is planning to take in the future
– 2 - Timeline is described extensively, including detailed graphical overview of the
operational steps the companies took and is planning to take in the future
Return to Section 4.4.

86

7.3. Software Release Life Cycle
The SRLC terminology is well established in the software industry. Figure 23 summarizes
the key terms used to identify both the test versions of the product and the release versions
of the product. In particular, there is a clear understanding that the qualifiers “alpha” and
“beta” identify incomplete products primarily used to obtain feedback prior to launching a
product openly in the market.
An alpha product is generally the first version of the product with its basic functionalities.
It is primarily used for testing within the organization, although there are exceptions to
this rule. Wikipedia defines it as follows:
Alpha software can be unstable and could cause crashes or data loss. Alpha
software may not contain all of the features that are planned for the final version.
In general, external availability of alpha software is uncommon in proprietary
software, while open source software often has publicly available alpha versions.
The alpha phase usually ends with a feature freeze, indicating that no more
features will be added to the software. At this time, the software is said to be
feature complete.
The beta product is the second milestone of the process and identifies a product that is
generally feature complete and is tested more openly. Beta testing comes in the form
of “private” or “closed”, where testers are screened by the organization, and “public” or
“open”, where testing is open to people. Wikipedia defines it as follows:
Beta phase generally begins when the software is feature complete but likely
to contain a number of known or unknown bugs. Software in the beta phase
will generally have many more bugs in it than completed software, as well as
speed/performance issues and may still cause crashes or data loss. The focus of
beta testing is reducing impacts to users, often incorporating usability testing.
The process of delivering a beta version to the users is called beta release and this
is typically the first time that the software is available outside of the organization
that developed it.
I use the testing phase of the SRLC to measure experimentation. I assume that each
instance of a test is an experiment. I define an experiment as the deliberate decision to
disclose an incomplete product with the primary purpose of obtaining market feedback. My
qualitative work suggests that this is generally the meaning software ventures have in mind
when talking about testing, as the quotes I report in the text suggest.
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Figure 23: Software Release Life Cycle

This figure illustrates the standard terminology used to define product testing and product launch in the
software industry.
The graph is produced by Heyinsun (Own work, CC BY 3.0) and is available at
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6818861. In the data collection, I assume the terms in the top
block to be instances of experimentation and the terms in the bottom block to be instances of launch.

However, there may be exceptions, which may potentially challenge the construct validity
(Bagozzi et al., 1991) of the study. There are two such main challenges.
First, companies may be using the “beta” jargon strategically. For example, they may call
a product a beta while in reality it is really a finished product86 . However, this type of
strategic behavior does not seem dominant in early-stage ventures. My qualitative work,
especially the survey, has not found substantial evidence for this phenomenon. Conceptually, there are two incentives for strategically misreporting the beta stage. To begin, a
venture might want to launch its finished product but still call it beta to lower customers’
expectations and avoid reputational damages if the product is not of sufficient quality 86

Google historically uses the “beta” terminology for many of its products, sometimes well beyond the
testing phase. Interestingly, even in this case, some observers have highlighted the appropriability concerns.
Girard (2009) (page 199) writes “Google’s systematic release of new products as beta versions keeps things
innovative and fresh and allows Google to outpace its competition. [...] By releasing early but not finishing
products, Google tips its hand to its competitors, revealing market needs and opportunities that other companies will try to fill. As a result, Google loses a competitive advantage and strengthens the competition.
Still another very significant risk is that too many mediocre, unfinished products risk diluting Google’s core
of exceptional products, thus lowering its reputation and market penetration.”
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this creates false positives in my data. On the other hand, a venture might want to drop
the qualifier beta early, even if still testing the product because the beta qualifier might
make potential users reluctant to use the product - this creates false negatives in my data.
Because these incentives are countervailing, it is likely that the bias in the data is limited.
Second, beta testing may not be a binary decision; companies may do more than one test
or may perform continuous testing. If this is the case, it is difficult to distinguish between
different tests. My qualitative work has confirmed that the data collected on the second
and third tests are relatively noisy. Therefore, I focus the analysis on the beginning of the
experimentation phase, and thus, the lack of precision of additional tests is not a concern.
This is perfectly consistent with my theoretical argument, which is based on the length of
the experimental phase and not on the number of experiments. Assuming the first test
as the start of an experimentation phase that ends at the time of launch appears fitting,
as the qualitative work has not found cases of companies starting to beta test and then
interrupting the process, going back to “stealth mode”.
Return to Section 5.3.

7.4. Alice Corp vs CLS Bank International
US Supreme Court ruling Alice Corp v. CLS Bank International is largely believed to
have decreased the viability of patenting in business-related software vis-a-vis other types
of software. For my empirical analysis, I assume that Alice affects business software and
takes place in March 2014, based on the my reading of legal literature and popular media.
I provide additional evidence in support of these assumptions.
To better understand the impact of Alice, I analyzed a total of unique 153 Alice-citing
decisions in the period of 2014-2017 (23% of the estimated total, according to LexisNexis).
I sourced decisions in two steps. First, I identified all Alice-citing decisions in the second
semester of 2014 in LexisNexis. Second, I analyzed all decisions in 2014-2017 reported as
“significant” by the Alice Tracker87 , a specialized website maintained by the global IP law
firm Fish & Richardson. For each decision, I worked with an RA to source the original
court ruling text from LexisNexis and code the key information, including court, parties,
patents at stake, and outcome.
The resulting decisions are distributed across time as follows: 47.1% in 2014, 35.9% in
2015, 13.1% in 2016, and 3.9% in 2017. At least one patent was invalidated in 61% of the
decisions. The courts involved were as follows: US Supreme Court (0.7%), US International
87

The website is available at www.fr.com/alice-tracker/.
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Trade Commission (0.7%), Patent Trial and Appeal Board (11.2%), US Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (18.4%), US District Courts (69%).
The analysis of the cases is consistent with the general view that business-related software
has been primarily affected by Alice. The relevant market (Accounting & Financial) and
the relevant patent class (705) are among the most affected. The only anomaly is the large
influence of videogames. However, a closer examination reveals that such an influence is
primarily explained by one plaintiff firm (McRo Inc) being involved in 21 court decisions
with 21 separate defendants. Rather than a systematic role played by the games market,
this appears to be due to the idiosyncratically aggressive strategy of one firm.
Regarding the timing of Alice, I assume that it takes place in March 2014. My qualitative
evidence suggests that there was already a diffused understanding that the Supreme Court
would have invalidated Alice’s patents in that month. A search of Google Trends supports
this view, revealing that the first substantial peak of the interest in Alice is in March 2014.
Return to Section 5.3.

7.5. Product Development Timeline
The core of the data collection process involves collecting information about the timing of the
key events of the product development process for each venture in the sample. Specifically,
I attempted to identify information about founding, testing, launch, and failure. I hired
and trained a team of research assistants to execute this step. The process took 4 iterations
over 12 months. The first iteration used a small sample of companies and a large set of
sources. The second and third iteration used the full sample of companies and progressively
reduced the sample of sources, seeking to maximize the efficiency of the process by focusing
on the most informative sources. The fourth iteration used the full sample of companies
and the final set of sources. The final version of the codebook is available upon request.
In the final version of the codebook, the key variables to be collected are the following:
• “Founding. Founding is the time in which the company is founded and starts building
its product. While this information is provided in the original data from Crunchbase,
it is often inaccurate. If you realize the founding date is inaccurate (for example,
the company was founded earlier than what the file says), please update it. In particular, if you notice TEST1 or LAUNCH come before the FOUNDING date, then
the FOUNDING date must be inaccurate. To identify the correct FOUNDING date,
examine the company’s LinkedIn page (see if the page mentions when the company
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started), the founders’ LinkedIn pages (see when they start working for the company)
or the company’s social media (see when social media pages start).”
• “Test 1. A Test is a preliminary version of the product that the company is building
and will launch in the future. In this situation, the company puts out a product and
qualifies it with one of the following terminologies: BETA, ALPHA, PROTOTYPE,
PILOT, MINIMUM VIABLE PRODUCT. The most common terminology used is
BETA.”
• “Launch. Launch is the launch of the finished product the company has built. This is
when a company puts out a product but does not use any of the qualifiers mentioned
above. Typically, sources talk about a launch with the following language: launch
a product, official launch, hard launch, general availability, grand opening, release a
product, unveil a product, reveal a product.”
• “Failure. Failure occurs if the company goes out of business and closes. Sometimes
the news will report that the company went out of business. If a company has neither
a recently-active social media (i.e. no Tweets or posts for a while) presence nor a
recently-active website (i.e. no recent copyright or other visible updates), we can
assume it is out of business. In that case, please take the last sign of life (see latest
social media post) as the failure date.”
In the final version of the codebook, the sources to be examined are the following: company’s
website, company’s blog, company’s Facebook page, company Twitter page, news section
in company’s Crunchbase page, Google search about the company (using a well-defined set
of keywords’ combinations), PR Web. In the previous iterations, I also used FACTIVA,
LexisNexis, EBSCO, and a variety of websites focused on advertising beta products, but
ultimately removed these sources because I found the information was generally redundant.
When collecting data about testing, the most common keyword was, as expected, “beta”.
Additional keywords used included “alpha”, “pilot”, “quiet release”, “minimum viable product”, “prototype”, “trial”, “test”, “early access”, “demo”, and “soft launch”.
The main advantage of collecting data this way is the possibility of using the entire software
industry. An alternative route, followed by Davis et al. (2014), is to use software version
numbers. While certainly valuable, this approach requires restricting the analysis to specific
software markets (i.e., mobile apps, videogames), where this practice is common. Version
numbering is not universal, and generally rare in enterprise software. To maximize the
external validity of the analysis, I decided to focus on the entire software industry, and this
led to the data collection process I employ here.
91

Naturally, this approach also has weaknesses, primarily in terms of measurement error.
There are two main sources of measurement error in this context.
First, it is in principle not implausible that the collection process has missed announcements
about testing or launch that were available on the Internet. For example, this may be due
to the effort or ability of the RA collecting the data of a given company. This source of
measurement error is plausibly unrelated to the analysis. When analyzing the impact of
Alice on experimentation or entry, this is a form of measurement error on the dependent
variable, which typically does not lead to bias but possibly makes the estimation noisier.
When analyzing the impact of experimentation on performance, it is instead a form of
measurement error on the independent variable. The literature shows that in such a case,
measurement error typically leads to attenuation bias, making the coefficients smaller than
its true value. Overall, it appears that measurement error due to missing announcements
may make the findings conservative.
Second, and more importantly, it is possible that ventures do not publish the announcements
of their test or launch. If this decision is related to unobserved variables in the analysis, it
would lead to bias. However, the incentive structure of early-stage ventures does not make
this scenario particularly plausible. When launching a product, it is unlikely that a venture
would not make the news public. The purpose of the launch is to reach large numbers of
potential users. Instead, when testing a product, ventures often attempt to target their
potential testers only, without making the information available to the broader market.
However, even in such a case, it seems quite unlikely that they would not mention this even
in their social media. As I analyze social media of each company carefully, these events
are likely to be in the data. Perhaps the only case in which I may not have information
is purely internal testing. When a test is executed in total secrecy inside the organization,
such a test does not qualify as an experiment here and, therefore, such a scenario does not
affect the analysis.
Return to Section 5.4.

7.6. Market Categorization
For empirical purposes, it was necessary to categorize ventures into their markets. I define
a market as a broadly defined product that allows a specific customer group to satisfy a
specific customer need. I created a “de novo” categorization because, to my knowledge,
there is no well-established comprehensive categorization. To create the categorization, I
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used the enterprise software categories from Engineering36088 and integrated them with
consumer software categories, generating a parsimonious but comprehensive list spanning
the entire software industry89 . The full codebook is available upon request.
The resulting categorization includes the following 27 software markets:
1. Accounting & Financial. Software that allows users to perform accounting and financial tasks. This may include bookkeeping, banking, billing, transaction management,
financial planning, financial reporting, invoicing, investing, and purchasing.
2. Application Development & Deployment. Software used in the development of a software product in a planned and structured process. This may include bug tracking,
cluster management, code analyzing, database management, integrated development,
compiling, debugging, middleware, programming languages, and special-purpose computer systems (embedded software).
3. Business Applications. Software that processes information in support of specific business functions. This may include business intelligence, business processes, cost estimation, customer relationship management, customer service and support, electronic
data interchange, human resources, legal activities, marketing, performance management, product data management, product life-cycle management, project management, sales management, scheduling, and voice recognition.
4. Content & Knowledge Management. Software that supports the creation and distribution of digital content, information, and knowledge. This may include the production
of documentation related to software, content management data mining, digital asset
management, document management, enterprise documentation management, knowledge management, and language translation.
5. Data Storage & Management. Software used for maintaining and accessing data stored
in data files. This may include backup and recovery, data storage management, and
data warehousing.
6. Engineering & Scientific. Software that supports the engineering and scientific pro88

The categorization is available at www.globalspec.com/productfinder/industrial engineering software.
The challenge of categorizing firms into markets is that the categorization itself is often the result
of firms’ choices. Pontikes and colleagues (Pontikes, 2012; Pontikes and Barnett, 2017) analyze how the
endogenous choice of choosing a category affects firm performance in the software industry. These dynamics
are influential when examining very granular categorizations (over 400 categories in Pontikes’ data). To
avoid this concern, in building my categorization, I chose to make it “coarse” enough to avoid that potential
confounders related to strategic behavior - firms choosing a given category or switching across categories would play a major role.
89
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cesses. This may include civil engineering, architecture, computational chemistry,
computer-aided design and manufacturing, statistical analysis, mathematics, geographic information, mechanics, laboratory management, modeling, and simulation.
7. Enterprise & Plant Management. Software used to manage the information and functions of a business. This may include maintenance, manufacturing intelligence, enterprise asset management, operations, plant management, risk assessment, supply
chain management, warehouse management, product quality assurance, product testing, and product compliance. This category includes the categories of Industrial
Controls and Quality Assurance.
8. Communications. Software used for the setup and management of computer networks (such as LAN and WAN), electronic mail, FAX, audio and video networks, and
wireless communication systems. This may include collaborative applications, mobile
and wireless, network monitoring, network simulation, protocol stack, remote control,
search engine, VoIP, and VPN.
9. Education & Training. Software used to support educational and training activities.
This may include education management, distance learning, and online training.
10. Office & Productivity. Software used to support office work activities. This may
include email management, file compression, office suite, operating systems, planning,
scheduling, and productivity.
11. Imaging & Graphics. Software used to create, analyze and edit digital images. This
may include drawing, graphics, visualization, image analytics, media and presentation,
video recognition, scanning, video processing, audio processing, and virtual reality.
12. Internet & Web. Software that allows users and programs to access the web and
operate on the Internet. This may include web browsing, web design, and Internet of
Things.
13. Security. Software used to guarantee electronic or physical security. This may include
anti-spam, anti-malware, biometrics, data security, network security, and personal
safety.
14. Construction & Real Estate. Software used to support construction and real estate
activities. This may include management of construction projects, monitoring of a
construction site, and real estate services.
15. Energy & Natural Resources. Software that allows the management of energy and

94

natural resources. This may include energy usage management, utility bills, natural
resources, recycling, sustainability, and water.
16. Healthcare. Software used to support healthcare services in hospitals, clinics, and
related facilities. This may include monitoring of medical devices, medical practice
management, and patient billing.
17. Transportation. Software used to facilitate the transportation of people or goods.
This may include shipping, tracking, logistics, and transport management.
18. Hospitality & Travel. Software used to facilitate activities related to hospitality and
travel. This may include hotel booking, event planning, and entertainment planning.
19. Food & Nutrition. Software used to support activities related to food and nutrition. This may include restaurant searching, restaurant booking, food information,
nutrition information, and agriculture.
20. Media & News. Software that facilitates the production and consumption of media
and news. This may include news distribution, video streaming, and media services.
21. Music & Arts. Software that facilitates the production of music and the arts. This
may include music distribution, music streaming, and music editing.
22. Games. Software that facilitates the creation and distribution of electronic and physical games. This may include video games, arcade games, gambling, and amusement
parks.
23. Retail & E-commerce.

Software that supports activities related to retail and e-

commerce. This may include e-commerce services and physical store management.
24. Social Networking. Software that allows activities related to social networking. This
may include network websites, family-related websites, and dating websites.
25. Sports. Software that facilitates the practicing, watching, and management of sports.
This may include physical activities management and sports analytics.
26. Charity, Social Impact, & Not-For-Profit. Software that facilities activities related to
charity, social impact, and not-for-profit initiatives.
27. Clothing, Fashion, Cosmetics, & Home. Software that facilitates services related to
clothing, fashion, cosmetics, and home.
Return to Section 5.4.
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